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A Core Competency Model for
Aligning Information Technology with Business Objectives
By Kurt Campbell
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management and the Engineering Systems Division on
May 11 th, 2007 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of Master of
Business Administration and Master of Science in Engineering Systems
Abstract
Advances in Information Technology and Information Systems delivery over the past
decades have restructured industries and created enormous value. Interestingly however,
research shows companies traditionally have a very difficult time capturing the value
from their investment. Any surplus created by these improvements is often competed
away and given back to customers.
Wall Street's irrational exuberance of the late 1990's has given way to a far more
conservative and critical view concerning IT investment. Decision makers are focused
on demonstrating that Information Technology expenditures result in positive net returns
to the company. IT managers are faced with a fundamental question: How does the
organization use Information Technology to create sustainable competitive advantage
and capture value in its industry?
This thesis proposes a framework, the Core Competency Model, to help companies think
about Information Services strategy and Information Technology deployment. Instead of
seeking to create competitive advantage through IT investment alone, it introduces the
concept of core competencies. IT resources can be quickly duplicated by competitors, as
has been shown in the research. Core competencies, the complex blending of unique
resources and capabilities, are much more difficult to duplicate and form the basis for
true sustainable competitive advantage. At its heart, the Core Competency Model
suggests that the role of the IS group is to support the formation and enhancement of the
organization's core competencies. It further identifies several capabilities and resources
that the IS group must possess to fully support the core competencies of the enterprise.
This model, if truly utilized, would change the nature of a company's internal dialog on
IT spending. Debate over which business units should get which IT resources would be
replaced with discussion of the strategic direction and core competencies of the company.
Decisions concerning IS resource allocation and IT spending would follow very naturally
from this discussion. The Core Competency Model provides a framework for this dialog,
beginning with the strategic identification of core competencies, and ending with the
tactical analysis of the Information Systems group's capabilities and resources. The final
chapter presents some recommendations aimed at helping BMC West successfully
develop a set of core competencies, the first step toward creating sustainable competitive
advantage in their industry.
Thesis Supervisors: Christopher L. Magee and Stephen C. Graves
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1. Introduction
1.1. Thesis Overview and Motivation
Delivering Information Services (IS) and Information Technology (IT) that result in
positive net value for the organization is inherently difficult. In the vast majority of
companies, a systemic divide exists between the IS group and the business units that it
services. Business unit leaders complain that the IS group doesn't understand the needs
on the front line. IS managers contend that business unit leaders aren't sensitive to the
limited resources available. In many cases, the relationship between the two groups
suffers and the strategic alignment between the actions of the IS group and the needs of
the business unit is severely compromised.
In BMC West's case, the situation is complicated by the fact that the corporate IS group
is serving two masters: SelectBuild and BMC West. SelectBuild is a new company with
an innovative business model. As such, it needs a fast and flexible IS group that provides
the latest in IT aimed at wringing out the inefficiencies in the homebuilding process.
BMC West, on the other hand, is a traditional materials distributor and supplier. It needs
an IS group focused on quality of service to both internal clients and external customers,
and incremental improvement of existing processes and software.
In March of 2006, three months before my LFM internship began, BMC West acquired
Home Millwork and Home Lumber in Rosenberg, Texas. The new locations were put
under the regional management headquartered at Lonestar Millwork in Houston, Texas.
From an information technology and business process standpoint, elements of the newly
purchased Home Millwork's system were superior to that of Lonestar. Much of this
internship was dedicated to integrating the operations of the two millwork facilities and
translating those superior processes from Home to Lonestar.
In the process of completing the internship objectives, I interacted heavily with the
corporate IT group and was able to use and participate in BMHC's software development
methodology, called the Solution Delivery Methodology, or SDM. These experiences
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led me to consider the process by which software is implemented within companies like
BMC West, and more importantly, what companies like BMC West can do to capture
value in the marketplace and create real, lasting competitive advantage through the use of
information technology.
The goal of this thesis is to consider the following question: How does a company like
BMC West fully utilize its significant information technology resources and economies
of scale in the building materials industry to create and capture sustainable competitive
advantage?
1.2. Thesis Outline
Chapter One introduces the topic and outline of the thesis. Chapter Two provides
background for both the company and the industry. Readers familiar with BMHC and
the homebuilding industry may choose to skip this material. Chapter Three summarizes
some of the literature on the subject of achieving competitive advantage through
investment in information technology. Chapter Four introduces the Core Competency
Model, a framework that could be used to inform and guide Information Services
decision making at BMHC or another similarly positioned company. The remainder of
the chapter analyzes BMC West using the proposed model. Finally, Chapter Five
summarizes and makes specific recommendations for BMHC going forward. Chapters
Six and Seven are appendices containing case studies of two projects I was involved with
during the internship.
In the course of conducting my internship, I was given a very unique perspective on the
political, cultural, and strategic operations within the company. Access to Jeff Lucchesi,
Terrill Rust, and others at the executive and vice presidential level gave me an
understanding of the vision that was being created from the top. At the same time,
working at the business unit level allowed me to experience ground level workings of the
company in a way that would be impossible for others in senior management to replicate.
In addition, my role was that of an outsider on the inside. As an outsider, I could remain
somewhat unbiased by the cultural and industrial environments that have developed over
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the years. Yet, as an insider, I was able to experience the day to day operational realities
of the company. This unique amalgamation of roles allowed me to identify and analyze
the vision, expectations, and assumptions that exist in the company. I was able to witness
the degree to which the vision at the top aligned with the realities at the bottom. I was
able to experience the culture within the millwork industry and contrast it with the
broader business environment we are exposed to as Leaders for Manufacturing students.
If BMC West has one major challenge, it is that the business units seem to be moving in
independent directions; all are pursuing their own goals and interests with little cohesive
or collective movement in any one direction. My goal is to create a tool that BMC West
and the Information Services group can use to align their actions and strategic objectives.
I do not intend to simply offer a critique of the company. Rather, I hope to inspire the
company to clarify and communicate its vision and to identify those core competencies
that it desires to cultivate. I hope that the IS group is able to use the Core Competency
Model to articulate its goals in developing the underlying resources and capabilities that
support the business units. Ultimately, my hope is that the Core Competency Model, or
some derivative of it, may serve as the lens that focuses the efforts of the various
functional groups on a single successful mission and vision.
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2. Company Background
2.1. US Homebuilding Industry
The US Homebuilding industry is composed of all residential construction, including
apartments, condominiums, individual home developments, and pre-built, modular, or
manufactured homes. In 2005, the market value of the industry was $646.4 billion.
Since 2000, low interest rates have driven impressive industry growth at 14.9% CAGR
despite population growth below 1% and GDP growth below 5%.
The industry is very fragmented, with the two largest homebuilders, Pulte and Lennar,
each accounting for less than 3% of industry revenue1. Much of the industry still
consists of privately owned regional homebuilders; although recent years have seen
increased consolidation in the industry due to the economies of scale that exist for
multiregional players.
In the traditional single-family-home market, the past fifty years have seen very little
change in the underlying process by which a house is built. Today, just as in the mid
1950's, the average home is constructed on the job site with lumber and building
materials delivered from a local lumber yard. It is built using subcontracted labor under
the supervision of a general contractor or superintendent. Today, as in the past, the home
may sit up to two-thirds of the time waiting for materials, permits, labor, or other inputs,
with no critical-path work being accomplished 2 . The following pictures show a home
under construction in the 1950's on the left, and in the 1990's on the right. The two
jobsites and the construction methodologies are indistinguishable3 .
1 Homebuilding in the United States: Industry Profile
2 Cushman, 1
3 Alexander, 6-7
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Figure 1: Homebuilding circa 1950 vs. 1990
Although the process of building a home in 2007 still looks very much the same as did
fifty years ago, the industry is in the midst of a transformation. Large homebuilders have
grown and consolidated to the point that they are beginning to see significant economies
of scale. Larger homebuilders are able to access capital from the public debt markets at
rates lower than that of the bank debt that funds smaller homebuilders. Whereas bank
debt dries up in recessionary periods, public debt is more patient, long term, and forward
looking. This increased access to capital for larger players is becoming more important
as land in the most sought after areas becomes scarce. As populations increase, the
regulation of land use is increasingly being determined at the state level rather than the
city or county level. As major housing markets become more regulated, the land
entitlement process becomes more difficult and capital-intensive to navigate. Those
companies with greater access to capital are finding themselves at a distinct advantage in
4the industry
In addition to having increased access to capital, large homebuilders are able to
experiment with technologies that make the homebuilding process more efficient. New
materials like steel studs, structural adhesives, composites, and recycled materials,
pioneered and once relegated to the commercial construction and manufactured home
industries, are being seen with increasing frequency in traditional homebuilding. New
manufacturing technologies like pre-built wall panels, trusses, and engineered wood
14
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products are becoming more common, especially in markets with unionized or otherwise
expensive labor.
In addition to using new and innovative materials, developers, contractors,
subcontractors, and materials suppliers are increasingly finding ways to use information
technology infrastructure to enhance communications and coordination in an effort drive
cost out of the homebuilding process. For instance, Kansas City-based Liberty Homes
has created an interactive scheduling portal to streamline communication with its
subcontractors. The on-site construction supervisor updates the status of each
construction site on a laptop computer running Microsoft Project. The contents of his
project plan are later pushed to a web portal where subcontractors go to find out what
needs to be done next. Because all communication is handled through this portal, the
finger-pointing that typically happens when something goes wrong is significantly
reduced; it is obvious who caused the delay in the system. Liberty Homes' system is so
successful that they have built over 1200 homes and have never been late on a closing
date. The company is now expanding its portal, www.jobsiteontime.com, and offering it
to other homebuilders5 .
As homebuilders seek to improve the construction process, cooperation and integration
with trade groups and building materials suppliers is becoming critical to achieving
efficiency in the homebuilding supply chain. BMC West and SelectBuild have foreseen
this need and are positioning themselves to become strategic partners with the leading
homebuilders.
2.2. Company Background
The history of BMC West, Select Build, and BMHC is recounted on the company's
corporate website:
On September 23, 1997, Building Materials Holding Corporation merged with BMC
West Corporation into its current holding structure. BMC West Corporation, the
15
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Company's predecessor and principal subsidiary, was formed in 1987 through the
acquisition of 20 building materials centers from Boise Cascade Corporation.
SelectBuild was formed in 1999 as part of an investment in Knipp Brother's
Industries6 .
The two wholly owned subsidiaries, BMC West and SelectBuild Construction, employ
more than 18,000 people nationwide in fourteen of the fastest growing states in the US.
The chart below shows BMHC's growth over the past 12 years. Much of the impressive
growth in the last few years has been through the acquisition of trade groups under the
SelectBuild side of the business.
BMHC Revenue
Revenue -e-Growth
3.50 - 60%
2.00 30%2.50
40%10%
0.00 0%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Figure 2: BMHC Revenue and Growth from 1995 to 20067
Although growth has slowed recently due to the softening residential construction
market, particularly in California, BMHC has remained profitable and has continued to
shift revenue toward the construction services market (SelectBuild) and away from the
more traditional and less lucrative building materials market (BMC West). The shift can
be seen in the following chart.
6 www.brnhc.com, Investor Information FAQ's
7 2005, 2006 Annual Report, BMCH
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BMHC Revenue Split Between Materials and Services
m Building Materials m Construction Services
100%
c 80%
60%
S 40%-_
S 20%
0% 1 '
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
Figure 3: BMHC revenue split, Building Materials and Construction Services8
2.3. SelectBuild Construction, Inc.
SelectBuild Construction, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of BMHC providing
construction services to large homebuilders in the residential construction market. To
understand SelectBuild's value proposition, it is first necessary to understand the process
by which land is developed into housing communities.
Large homebuilders typically purchase sections of land and create value both by correctly
speculating that the chosen land will be in an area that people will want to live, and by
navigating the regulatory and zoning hurdles put in place by cities, counties, and states.
They then develop these sections of land by laying roads, sewers, water, and electrical
services, and carving the land into plots that will eventually have houses built on them.
The builders pick off a portion of the lots, normally the best, to offer to customers under
their own brand. They then sell the rest of the lots to other builders in order to pay down
the investment in the land and other development costs. Often a single development will
be broken up into multiple sections and will be grouped by either construction phase or
lot size.
17
8 2005, 2006 Annual Report, BMCH
Lots are considered developed when roads, electrical, water, and other services are run to
the site. At this point, building can begin. Large homebuilders will build multiple
houses at a time and attempt to schedule the various construction projects such that a
crew performing a specific task, say interior trim installation, can move from house to
house with little or no downtime between. Typically builders employ a superintendent
who is responsible for one or more ongoing construction projects. A typical
superintendent may complete 30 houses in a given year, implying that they are
monitoring approximately 10 projects at any given time9 . The superintendent schedules
trade groups to perform narrow tasks such as concreting, plumbing, framing, or electrical.
They also schedule inspections, obtain necessary permits, schedule and release material
deliveries, and monitor the project finances.
Superintendents are faced with a very difficult job. Most trade groups are subcontractors
who focus narrowly on their niche and do not have expertise in other functions. They are
contracted to provide their service and their service only. This causes an inherent
misalignment of incentives. For instance, a framing sub-contractor might come out to the
jobsite to discover that the concrete sub-contractor failed to complete his job to some
specification. The framing sub has no incentive to either fix the problem, or to work
directly with the concrete sub because he is being paid on a per job basis to complete his
work. His only recourse is to leave the jobsite, contact the superintendent, and come
back later. Building a house requires the completion of hundreds of tasks with dozens of
contractors, and situations like this extend the time necessary to build a house to three or
four times the actual value-added time.
SelectBuild seeks to make the building process more efficient by offering its customers
an integrated labor force. Selectbuild owns multiple trade groups and is therefore able to
schedule their work more efficiently. Moreover, SelectBuild attempts to cross-train their
trades such that a framer who arrives at a jobsite to find minor problems with the
9 Cushman. Calculation based on 120 days per house and one house completion every 12 days. Little's
Law says that In process inventory equals completion rate multiplied by throughput time. 1/12 * 120 = 10
housing projects at once.
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concreter's work is able to simply fix the problem, rather than cause delays by notifying a
third party and going to a different jobsite. By putting the trades under one roof,
incentives are more aligned, and coordination mechanisms are centralized and
standardized. This leads to much more efficient builds. Traditionally, large
homebuilders make their money off of the development of lots, and build and retail
houses simply to maintain their brand and connection to the end customer. They are in
the land speculation and development business, so the outsourcing of construction and
project management is very compelling.
SelectBuild is indeed finding success with this new model for residential construction.
They have partnered with and offer their services to large homebuilders like KB Homes
and, as seen in the company overview section, are growing very quickly both organically
and through acquisition.
2.4. BMC West
While SelectBuild is creating a very new business model and value proposition in
construction labor and services, BMC West is fulfilling the much more traditional role of
materials supplier. BMC West's offerings include the following:
Lumber - Lumber is selected and assembled into "house packs" which contain the
right amount and combination of lumber to build a certain house or phase of a house.
The lumber is then delivered to the jobsite on flatbed semi trucks.
Engineered Wood Products - Engineered wood products comprise laminated
beams, manufactured trusses, manufactured joists, and other wood products that are
in some way value-added. Trusses are an example of a product that requires
extensive customization and provides the opportunity for a materials supplier to add
considerable value to what is usually a commoditized product. Trusses are the
triangular sections that determine the shape of the roof of a house. The truss design
for a particular house requires many hours of engineering time and represents a
considerable upfront investment on the part of the homebuilder. In return, the
homebuilder's framing crew is able to simply tack the trusses in place, rather than
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having to build them on the jobsite. This results in both cost savings and a superior
quality product.
Pre-hung Doors - Pre-hung doors are interior and exterior door units with pre-
installed frames, hinges, and decorative casings. Doors are also assembled into
"house packs" that contain all the doors for a given house. Often the exterior doors
are shipped before the interior walls are sheet-rocked, allowing the builder to lock up
the unfinished house. Once the interior walls have been sheet-rocked, taped, and
textured, the interior door units and other interior trim, like crown molding and base
board, are shipped. The to-order assembly of pre-hung doors takes place in a
"millwork". Oftentimes trim, cabinetry, and windows are offered from the same
location. Lumber and engineered wood products are generally separate operations
from millwork, though they could be co-located and managed using the same
property and resources.
Cabinetry - Cabinetry comprises the kitchen, bathroom, and utility cabinets in a
house. In the majority of markets, cabinets are ordered to specification from
manufacturers and delivered to the jobsite. Cabinets are one area where large
homebuilders now leverage their scale and go directly to the manufacturers to obtain
preferred pricing, effectively cutting out distributors like BMC West.
Trim - Trim includes crown molding, base molding, stair railings and balusters,
finish-quality wood and plywood, and all other products that finish the interior of a
house. These supplies are often delivered to the construction site with the interior
doors.
In all of these areas, a materials supplier like BMC West might sell to three different
types of builders, each with somewhat different needs. Although some differences might
exist in lumber and engineered wood, the main differentiation exists in the quality and
construction of the doors, cabinets, and trim that each segment would typically require.
The different builder segments include:
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True Custom - True custom builders do just what one would expect; they build truly
customized houses. These customers order custom designed, hand built, hardwood
doors and windows manufactured to their exact specifications. A typical true custom
front door might have two door panels, two sidelights (panels on either side of the
door, often with glass), and a transom, sometimes arched, curved, or artistically
designed in some way. The price of a complete door unit could easily top $10,000.
These builders may also employ finish carpenters who fabricate and install hardwood
paneling and trim, as might be done in a library, office, or kitchen for instance, and
order the finish-quality wood from a material supplier like BMC West. In many
markets this is a dying art, and cabinets and other finish carpentry items are built
offsite in a factory setting. Houston, however, is one market in which this type of
craftsmanship is still readily available.
Production Builder - The production builders are the KB Homes, Pulte Homes,
Lennar, and other companies that are in the business of mass development and
construction. These companies often construct larger, more expensive homes that fit
into the custom builder category below, but the majority of their business is in lower
end, entry level homes. These entry level homes are built to compete on price. They
use standard components, doors, and trim to save cost. From the materials supplier
standpoint, production builders offer a higher volume and lower margin revenue
stream. Their casing, trim, door frames, and door panels are more standardized and
rarely deviate from the standard.
Custom Builder - A custom builder is halfway between a production builder and a
true custom builder. They build or remodel homes that require a certain amount of
customization, but stay within a set of pre-manufactured components. For instance, a
custom builder might order a special-order pre-built door, with a specific hinge type,
and a non-standard casing, but would not specify a fully custom-built door or window
like a true-custom customer. In addition, their interior doors might be specified as
solid wood, rather than the cheaper hollow-core doors more commonly used by
production builders.
21
3. Literature Review - Extracting Value from IT
3.1. The Business Value of Information Technology
During the 1980's, many studies explored the relationship between a company's
investment in information technology and the firm's value. Although the results were
mixed, the evidence overwhelmingly suggested that no positive relationship exists. The
term "productivity paradox" was coined to describe this phenomenon and Nobel winning
economist Robert Solow summed the research up in his oft quoted quip, "You can see the
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics."
Over the next decade, however, evidence began to build suggesting that investment in IT
did in fact increase firm level performance in a variety of ways. In 1993, Erik
Brynjolfsson was among the first to use production functions describing the relationship
between firm output and several inputs like labor hours, IT capital stock, etc, to show that
IT investment did in fact contribute to firm productivity' 0 . Subsequent studies showed
that IT not only offered positive returns on investment, but that IT offered excess returns,
indicating that firms might actually be under-investing in IT'".
In 1996, Brynojolfsson and Lorin M. Hitt published a critical article that helped to clarify
the seemingly contradictory results of previous work, some indicating a significant
benefit from IT investment and others showing no benefit at all. Their research focused
on three different measures of value: firm productivity, firm profitability, and consumer
surplus. Their survey of 370 firms over the period from 1988 to 1992 showed that while
productivity increased with investment in IT, profitability did not. In fact, in some cases
it seemed that profitability might actually fall slightly. At the same time, they showed
that consumer surplus increased. The paper concluded that "firms are making the IT
10 Brynjolfsson, E. 1993.
" Dedrick, J., Gurbaxani, V., and Kraemer, K. 2003.
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investments necessary to maintain competitive parity, but are not able to gain competitive
advantage. 12 "
3.2. IT as an Infrastructural Technology
In his book entitled Does IT Matter? Nicholas G. Carr attempts to explain why
companies fail to achieve competitive advantage through information technology. He
highlights the difference between proprietary technologies and infrastructural
technologies. Proprietary technologies are those that can be owned, and whose value
can be extracted, by a single company. Technologies that are protected by patents, for
instance, are unavailable to competitors and therefore proprietary. Innovative processes
that are difficult or impossible for competitors to replicate, what other texts call a
capability based advantage, may also constitute proprietary technologies. Carr described
infrastructural technologies as those that are far more valuable to society when shared by
all than when used in isolation. I would further refine the definition to the following:
An infrastructural technology is one in which the benefits of creating a customized,
proprietary solution are outweighed by the costs of creating that technology. When
faced with this choice, companies settle for a more publicly available, yet perhaps not
fully optimized technology. This technology then becomes an infrastructural
technology.
Carr identifies some properties of infrastructural technologies:
There is significant benefit to standardization - electricity, railroads, and the
interstate highway system are examples of traditional standardized infrastructures.
The GAPP accounting rules, in addition to being mandated by the SEC, are a less
obvious example of a standardized infrastructure that allows a company's financial
information to be compared to that of other companies. In all cases, there is
significant benefit to standardization, either to the company or to the consumer.
Returns to scale exist - the net benefit to individual users is increased when more
use the technology, either because the cost is spread over a larger user base, i.e.
12 Hitt, L. M. and Brynjolfsson, E. 1996.
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supply side returns to scale, or because the inherent value is increased when others
use it, i.e. demand side returns to scale or network effects.
Although not specifically identified in Carr's book, I believe infrastructural technologies
also have the following properties:
It is better shared than kept to oneself - An infrastructural technology is one in
which the owner receives substantially more benefit from distributing the technology
than it would by keeping it proprietary. For instance, the Microsoft Windows
operating system is much more valuable to Microsoft if it licenses it to others than if
it were kept by Microsoft and used as a competitive advantage in some other market.
By contrast, Coca Cola Company's formula for its Coke products is valuable
precisely because it does not allow others to use it; the Coke formula is therefore a
proprietary technology. As a consequence, infrastructural technologies end up being
available to all competitors in a market and their benefits are therefore not available
to any single user in isolation.
Its value is easily transferred, yet it is not easily replicated - This property is a
corollary to the one stated above. In order to be valuable if shared, the technology
must be relatively easy to transfer. To avoid simply being copied once it is
distributed, replication must be difficult. Windows again provides an illustrating
example. In the US, where copyright and patent laws are rigidly protected by the
courts, software is very easy to distribute, and quite difficult to replicate legally.
Software companies are able to create infrastructural type technologies and able to
extract value at the same time. In foreign markets, however, where these laws are not
respected, software piracy provides a formidable challenge and one would expect to
see fewer infrastructural type technologies being developed due to the lack of
protection afforded the owner.
Toyota provides an interesting counter-example illustrating the connection between the
two properties above. The Toyota Production System is clearly a proprietary technology.
One could argue that it would be much more valuable for Toyota to teach other
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companies its system, rather than to manufacture and sell cars. The technology is very
difficult to transfer, however, because it only exists in the complex relationships and
culture of the company. Moreover, if a method of efficiently transferring the Toyota
Production System was discovered, the system might then become easily replicated, thus
destroying the value for Toyota. For this reason, the Toyota Production System remains
a proprietary technology.
By definition, due to the availability of infrastructural technologies, and the cost/benefit
tradeoffs involved in replicating what already exists, users of infrastructural technologies
are virtually incapable of using them to create any sustainable competitive advantage. In
fact, if a defendable competitive advantage could be created simply by using the
technology, the technology itself would have to be redefined as a proprietary one.
Carr goes on to effectively argue that although many executives continue to talk about
using information technology to create strategic value for their companies and for
shareholders, information technology is fast becoming an infrastructural technology.
Extracting competitive advantage from IT is therefore becoming increasingly difficult,
and will continue to get more elusive as the technology matures and the playing field
levels. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software serves as an illustrative example.
At one time, businesses were forced to create software systems from the ground up that
were highly customized to their business and processes. As generic software packages
like Oracle and SAP became more powerful, the need to reinvent the software "wheel"
was diminished. Providers of targeted software solutions created add-ons aimed at
specific industries, and companies increasingly questioned the need to customize. Carr
quotes a writer from Inbound Logistics. "While most companies once thought that their
business processes were too unique to use configurable software (as opposed to
customized software), transportation managers are quickly realizing that leveraging
industry best-practices far outweighs the benefit of perpetuating a unique process.' 3" As
ERP systems continue to become larger and more powerful, the market is forced toward
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standardization, and the technology ceases to be a source of advantage, and instead
becomes a commoditized input necessary for effective competition.
3.3. Some Firms Do Extract Value from IT
Although studies show that on average investment in information technology does not
lead to competitive advantage, they also show that the returns among individual
companies are highly variable. In other words, the variance in benefit gained for each
dollar spent on IT (marginal benefit) is higher than the variance in benefit gained from
other non-IT investments. This leads to the conclusion that some firms are able to use IT
more effectively, and those firms do in fact capture value from their investment. There
are two factors to which this variance can be attributed, idiosyncratic firm factors and
firm-level capabilities and resources. Idiosyncratic characteristics include market
position, cost structure, brand, and other qualities that are not easily manipulated in the
short run by management, but contribute to a firm's ability to derive benefits from IT
investment. Firm-level capabilities and resources include the specific management
practices and complementary investments that also serve to enhance the benefit of
investment in IT'4 .
Some research has focused on identifying scenarios under which IT investments become
valuable. Carr points out that firms in slower moving industries are often able to take
advantage of IT investment to create temporary competitive advantages that simply last
long enough to provide a decent return on investment 5 . Other studies have shown that
firms in monopolistic or duopolistic situations are able to more effectively capture value
from IT16. These studies serve to identify the characteristics of industries in which IT
investment will likely have a higher payoff.
In his 1994 paper, Gary W. Loveman argued that the variance in firm results could be
explained by differences in firms' ability to integrate IT with the business and human
14 Dedrick 9.
15 Carr.
16 Ravichandran, T. and Lertwongsatien, 240.
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resource management strategy, and in the ability to efficiently allocate resources. In
2000, Tallon went on to show that aligning IT and business strategy increases the return
from IT investments. Devaraj and Kohli also found that IT investment, when combined
with business process reengineering, produces positive returns1 7. This stream of research
indicates that strategic alignment between the business and the Information Service
department (IS) is a critical element in capturing value from investment in IT.
The above research shows that the strategic value gained from investment in IT is not
simply a matter of the amount spent, but also a question of the firm's capabilities and
resource utilization.
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4. The Core Competency Model
4.1. Information Services Support for Core Competencies
In their 2005 paper, Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien (R&L) attempted to unify much of
the previous research by creating and testing an empirical model for delivering value
from IT. At its heart, their research identifies the creation and development of Core
Competencies as the primary means of creating sustainable competitive advantage.
Core competencies are unique and tightly woven bundles of overlapping resources and
capabilities that are valued by the marketplace and are difficult to replicate by
competitors. Different combinations of these core competencies are what allow for
differentiation among firms in a marketplace. The strategic use of core competencies
leads to tangible competitive advantage, i.e. the ability to extract abnormally high profits
from and industry when compared to the competition.
To extract value from IT investment, R&L suggest that activities performed by the
Information Services group must be aimed at developing and enhancing the core
competencies of the organization. This focus, they propose, results in higher profits,
greater differentiation, and increased firm value. In their words, "firms that target IS
initiatives toward their core competencies are likely to realize greater value from their IS
assets than those that are less focused in their IT deployment."
The researchers go on to define some specific capabilities and resources that they believe
are indicative of an organization's "support for core competencies". An organization
possessing these capabilities and resources is better able to focus its IT efforts on those
projects that help create core competencies, and therefore competitive advantage.
The Resource Based View of the firm (RBV) provides a definition of resources and
capabilities. Resources are "stocks of available factors of production owned or
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controlled by a firm.' 8" They might be intellectual property, a large manufacturing
capacity, or a very strong brand. Resources are possessions which belong to the firm and
cannot be easily carried away.
Capabilities, on the other hand, are defined as an organization's capacity to perform a
task or activity. They are not assets in and of themselves; however they are often formed
through combinations of resources, employees, established processes, and other company
assets.
As an example, consumer products company Johnson & Johnson possesses some strong
resources: a strong product development process, an influential brand, and a network of
marketing and retail relationships. It is able to combine these resources to form a very
strong capability; the ability to continually develop, manufacture, and distribute new
products that its customers find compelling.
R&L suggest that an IS group possessing the following four capabilities would be better
suited to create and sustain the organization's core competencies:
* IS Planning Sophistication
* IT Development Capability
" Support Maturity
" Operations Capability
These capabilities in turn are heavily influenced by the development of the following key
resources:
* IS Partnership Quality
" IS Human Capital
" IT Infrastructure Flexibility
R&L's study concludes that possession of the proposed capabilities and resources does in
fact assist in the delivery of information technology solutions that allows the firm to
capture positive net benefits from its investment.
18 Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien, 240.
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R&L's model provides a powerful framework for structuring a company's internal dialog
around the strategic and tactical delivery of Information Services. Their research model,
however, uses language that is referential to the body of literature on the subject of IS
delivery, and is therefore non-intuitive to an end user in a IS group or business unit. For
this reason, I have created the following representation of their model that is more
appropriate for use in a business setting. This representation is referred to as the Core
Competency Model.
Information Systems
Resources Capabilities
Partnership Quality Planning Sophistocation
Human Capital Development Capability
Support Maturity
Infrastructure Flexibility Operations Capability
Business Unit
Core
Competenci
- Market Access
Value Delivery
Innovation
es
Customer
Value
Figure 4: The Core Competency Model
The Core Competency Model illustrates the relationships between resources, capabilities,
and core competencies. Resources are the basic building blocks that an organization
possesses. These resources are combined to form capabilities. Each department or
business unit within the organization might possess its own resources and capabilities. In
this version, aimed at the IS Group, the "Business Unit" is included to suggest that it too
possesses unique resources and capabilities.
The resources and capabilities of all of the functional groups in the organization combine
to form the company's core competencies. These core competencies encompass the
competitive advantages and strategic direction the company is pursuing. The core
competencies, in the end, are designed to provide value to the customer.
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The inclusion of both the IS group and the business units emphasizes the importance of
the partnership between the two groups, and the shared goal of creating organization-
wide core competencies and customer value.
4.2. BMC West's Core Competencies
The Core Competency Model, as its name suggests, requires that an organization identify
those competencies that it believes will lead to perceived customer value and sustainable
competitive advantage. Although it may sound straightforward, the identification and
negotiation of core competencies among the various stakeholders in a company might
take a team of people several months to complete. It is as much a process of
inventorying current resources and capabilities as it is a strategic exercise in determining
which resources and capabilities must be developed in the future. It requires the
company to understand the current state, articulate a future state, and tangibly quantify
the gaps between the two. Most importantly, it requires a cultural shift in the
organization away from talking of products, markets, business units, and geographical
boundaries, and towards talk of more broadly defined capabilities and competencies.
Core competencies transcend individual products, services, and business units to focus on
those abilities possessed by the entire organization that allow it to grow into new markets
and reinvent old ones with new technologies or business models.
In the following section, I will identify some possible core competencies that BMC West
could develop. Before introducing the specific competencies, however, I must first spend
some time defining exactly what does and does not constitute a core competency.
In his article The Concept of Core Competence, Gary Hamel19 describes core
competencies as the end product resulting from a firm's choice about which resources to
acquire, combine, and deploy over an extended period of time. They are formed by
creating a complex web of strategically linked resources and capabilities. To create
lasting value for the company, they must be difficult to replicate by competitors, either
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because the specific combination of factors is hard to ascertain, or because key resources
necessary to build the competency are tightly held by the organization.
Core competencies must deliver a fundamental and differentiated customer benefit if they
are to add value to the organization20 . Toyota offers an example of the difference
between a true core competency and a capability.
Many would argue that Toyota has a core competency in building high levels of quality
into its cars. Their abilities are unique and difficult to replicate, and customers value the
ability as evidenced by the company's growing market share. Toyota has also built a
capability around managing their dealer network in the United States. This expertise in
managing dealers, however, does not rise to the level of a core competency because it
does not offer a significant and differentiating benefit to the customer when compared
with the competition. Every car maker has a similar dealer structure.
On the other hand, suppose they were to implement a radically different approach to
selling cars by offering a fully customized car from factory to customer in five business
days. In such a case, Toyota could claim a core competency around the manufacturing
processes and distribution network required to provide such a unique service.
At the corporate level, a true core competency should also help a company enter and
succeed in new markets, not simply sustain the markets that it already has. For instance,
Amazon.com's warehouse network and back-end software capabilities allowed it to
expand from its original market, selling and distributing its own goods, to an additional
market providing e-commerce, warehousing, and distribution services to third parties like
Toys R Us and Target. Similarly, Toyota's core competency in manufacturing high
quality, low cost cars prompted it to begin selling high quality, low cost modular housing
in Japan.
Hamel suggests that a given company, upon forming a group to identify the competencies
possessed by the organization, should arrive at a list of about five to fifteen core
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competencies to focus on. In this definition phase, a fine line exists between what he
calls meta-competencies, core competencies, and constituent capabilities. An example
from Hamel's work illustrating the difference is FedEx. Logistics in general would be a
meta-competency. Although it passes the tests laid out above, it is too large and vague a
classification to serve as a useful core competency. FedEx's package routing and
tracking, however, might be an appropriately defined core competency. These
capabilities are far superior to competitors (with the possible exception of UPS) and
therefore provide a differentiation and a distinct customer value. They also allow FedEx
to move into new businesses like warehousing and distribution of third party goods. Bar
coding, on the other hand, is probably too narrowly defined and non-differentiating to be
a useful core competency; everyone can and does implement similar technology. Bar
coding is really more of a constituent capability.
Hamel describes core competencies as falling into three fundamental categories. Market-
access competencies are those that allow a firm to maintain close contact to its
customers, identify their needs, and respond quickly to shifts in customer needs and
tastes. Integrity-related competencies are those that allow a firm to offer reliable,
convenient, and appropriately priced products and services to meet those needs.
"Efficient manufacturing operations, streamlined supply chains, and integrated business
processes are some indicators of integrity-related competencies.2 1 " Functionality-related
competencies are those that "enable a firm to offer unique products and services with
distinctive customer benefits. 2 2" A company that possesses a competency in this area
will likely have strong product development and innovation capabilities. In the following
sections, I will define and comment on each category and identify specific core
competencies that BMC West might develop in an effort to create competitive advantage
in their industry.
21 Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien, 243.
22 Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien, 243.
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4.3. Market Access Core Competencies
A competency in market access is defined as the skills that put a company in close
proximity to its customer; it is the ability to create a relationship with customers,
understand their needs, and respond quickly as those needs change. Examples might
include the development and management of a brand, sales and marketing techniques, or
a distribution process.
On one hand, market access competencies comprise the skills a company uses to capture
value from the market it currently possesses. In the business of building materials
distribution, these skills center on the sales process and the ability to deliver product
quickly, accurately, and with minimal disruption to the customer's building process.
While it already has many capabilities in this regard, BMC West would benefit from
developing a core competency in sales support to streamline the sales process and
capture the resulting value. On the other hand, market access competencies also describe
many of the skills that allow a company to enter new markets, both in terms of vertical
and horizontal product scope, and in terms of geographical boundary. BMC West was
built largely through acquisition, and each new acquisition brings with it a new market.
The company would also benefit from building a core competency in the acquisition and
integration of these new business units and the resulting new markets.
4.3.1. Competency in Sales Support
BMC West does relatively well at selling its products to customers. Most locations
follow the standard industry structure of having "outside" salespeople who interact with
customers, walk the houses, and schedule deliveries. These outside salespeople are
supported by an "inside" sales staff that enters orders, monitors production progress, and
communicates internal status back to the outside salesperson. The outside salesperson,
however, has a tremendous amount of power in the transaction. Customers work almost
exclusively with the outside salesperson and each salesperson develops unique routines
to satisfy a particular customer. When a salesperson moves from one building material
distributor to another, customers routinely follow, as it is far less disruptive to change
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suppliers then it is to change salespeople. The amount of power in the relationship is
illustrated by the surplus that is extracted in each sale. Typical gross margins in the
industry are 25 to 30%. Of that, the distributor might capture approximately 5% of the
total sale as profit. A salesperson, however, might capture 5 to 10% of the gross margin,
or 1.5 to 3% of the total sale for themselves. The ratio of profit to the company versus
profit to the salesperson can serve as a proxy for the relative importance of the two
entities in the transaction.
Although this model works well to get product to customers, much of the value in the
transaction is captured by salespeople who, although employed at any given time by a
distribution company, end up looking a lot more like free agents. BMC West pays a
premium for highly experienced salespeople, and lacks formal training mechanisms that
would allow the use of less experienced labor. Moreover, the company does not possess
any overriding system that would allow it to take some of this surplus back. In effect,
BMC West is outsourcing the majority of its market access capabilities to salespeople,
and paying the market rate for it. The company is therefore not capturing any abnormal
portion of the value, and therefore cannot claim a core competency in this area.
If BMC West focuses on sales support as a core competency, and concentrates on
developing capabilities, resources, systems, and processes around it, the company could
minimize the power salespeople currently have in each sales transaction. The most
important aspect of a competency like this is the development of a stronger relationship
between the company and the customer, with the aim of proportionally weakening the
relationship between the salesperson and the customer.
To achieve this goal, a more universal sales process must be created that allows one
salesperson to take over the work of another more seamlessly. A formal training program
would allow new salespeople to achieve proficiency more quickly, thereby reducing the
dependence on a highly experienced sales force. The sales support system should also
establish links from the customer to the distributor in an attempt to create barriers to exit.
For example, applications that enable customers to automatically initiate orders, view
status, retrieve documentation and invoices, and rectify problems might create such links.
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Regardless of the specific capabilities and resources that are combined to create this
competency, such a process requires a complex mixture of culture, back end processes,
IT systems, and hardware that link salespeople and customers into the order processing
system.
One location manager I spoke to understood this issue and implemented policies to
combat it. The location initiated a "Three Points Program" where the best customers had
three points of contact within the company: the salesperson and two others, one of which
was the plant manager or operations manager. Second tier customers were given two
points of contact, and the lowest value customers were allowed to have the salesperson as
a single point of contact. This way, if a salesperson leaves the company, the most
important customers retain personal relationships with representatives of the company.
By formalizing the above concepts at the corporate level, and creating company-wide
systems that support the development of a sales support core competency, BMC West
can mitigate the economic power of salespeople and the associated risk of losing large
portions of business every time a salesperson switches employers.
Developing a core competency aimed at increasing the relative value of a company in the
sales cycle might be resisted by members of the sales staff. Salespeople rely on finely
tuned and closely-guarded sales processes to create security and individual competitive
advantage. Politically, any effort to directly undermine their power will fail. Rather, an
integrated sales support system can only be created if the sincere intent is to provide
superior customer service. In so doing, the company will capture both benefits.
4.3.2. Competency in Acquisition and Integration
BMC West and its parent BMHC have grown tremendously over the past decade. The
vast majority of this growth has been through acquisition. The ability to identify markets
or locations that are of strategic importance would be a very powerful core competency.
Wal*Mart provides a great example of a company with a competency in this area.
Wal*Mart grew to be the dominant retailer in the US by selecting locations in small
towns that could only support one store of its size. Research has shown that in those
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areas where competition is precluded, Wal*Mart is able to charge a price premium and
therefore extract a surplus from its competency in location selection23 . The distinction
should be made clear between the locations themselves, and the ability to select new
locations. The existing locations constitute a physical resource, whereas the ability to
identify and build stores in the right locations and extract a profit constitutes a core
competency.
Currently, acquisition decisions at BMC West are made on an individual basis and are
justified by gut level intuition rather than a methodology backed by data and market
analysis. The drawbacks of this approach became obvious midway through the
internship when management was looking to purchase land for a lumberyard in North
Houston. They were faced with determining the best land acquisition option without any
analytical tools or decision-support mechanisms to aid the process.
Two suitable sites for the new lumberyard were found, each with its own benefits and
drawbacks. One of the key tradeoffs between the two was ease of development versus
physical proximity to current construction sites, i.e. the location that was closer to
customers was less suitable for development, and vice versa. From Houston's
perspective, the corporation had no tools or established processes to help inform the
decision.
To make the best decision, management wanted to have an objective understanding of the
proximity of housing developments to the two potential lumberyard sites. This
information was available through a piece of software called MetroSearch 24 , but this
software is very complex and learning how to effectively use it requires many hours of
training and practice. Despite the fact that other locations in the company use the same
software, no centralized expertise has been developed to help transfer the knowledge
gained by one location to another. Therefore, a question that could have been answered
23 Bradley
2 4 http://www.metrostidy.com - Metrostudy monitors construction in markets around the country and
makes the data available through its MetroSearch product.
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in two hours by an experienced user, took many days worth of effort and weeks worth of
time.
This example illustrates only one of the hundreds of questions to be considered when a
new acquisition is being made. At the very least, having a basic checklist of the
questions to ask, issues to consider, and resources and expertise available in the company
would be beneficial. Unfortunately, because the process is not formalized, all of the
learning acquired during the purchase of this new lumberyard location in Houston will
only reside in the minds of those involved at the local level and will essentially be lost to
the company. Other locations will need to reinvent the same "wheel" each time a new
location is acquired.
In addition to developing a core competency around identifying acquisition targets, the
company would also benefit from the ability to integrate newly acquired companies into
their organization in a more efficient way. When BMC West acquired Home Lumber
and Home Millwork, support was given from the corporate level for the conversion of the
MRP system to SX.e, and for the training of new employees on the new system.
Assistance with aspects of integration beyond software conversion was neither available
nor wanted by the local management. For example, business processes were simply
mirrored to match the existing Houston locations rather than being brought up to the best
practices in the company or industry. The new employees and management were only
marginally integrated into the existing company, and to this day cultural conflicts
continue to create problems. Those that fail to integrate will likely leave or be forced out
of the organization, taking years of experience and customer relationships with them.
The Houston region boasts some of the most experienced and successful management in
the company, and the acquisition therefore went relatively well. Nevertheless, these
types of integrations happen only a handful of times in any one manager's career; they
shouldn't be expected to have all the answers when it comes to merging companies,
cultures, and processes. It is easy to envision a process and support system for the
integration of newly acquired companies that goes beyond simply duplicating the
software and information technology infrastructure to the new location; one that allows a
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manager to more successfully integrate and deploy the talent and resources that existed
before the acquisition. It is easy to imagine that with some effort a more formalized
process could be created at the corporate level to bring new acquisitions into the
organization, and to train management, unify business processes, and reassure employees
more quickly and successfully.
4.4. Value Delivery Core Competencies
Core competencies in value delivery are, to quote Hamel, the skills that "allow a
company to do things more quickly, flexibly, or with a higher degree of reliability than
competitors.25 " They might include things like process improvement, quality of
service/product, manufacturing, or inventory management. For an operations-oriented
company like BMC West, one would expect these core competencies to be the most
developed.
Over the course of my internship, I often heard executive management speak very highly
of local and regional management at BMC West. Many plant managers have grown up in
the building materials business and have not had the benefit of observing other industries
or products. Most have not had formal training in operations or management. Many
managers are the first to joke about the fact that they started as truck drivers or line
workers. Nevertheless, it is said that these managers' capabilities should not be
underestimated; they run very sophisticated and finely tuned organizations. I found this
to be very much the case. The Houston millwork was manufacturing thousands of doors
a month just-in-time for its customers, and finished-goods inventory was virtually non-
existent. It was impressive to see an operation built from the ground up by people with
little formal training, but a huge amount of practical experience, rivaling Dell in its
complexity and ability to deliver built-to-order products to customers within a four day
production window.
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Interestingly, when executive management speaks of these capabilities, they always refer
to local management in the third person. They are very capable. The executives never
refer to the company's ability to create capable management. Although it is subtle, this
sentiment indicates that the corporation as a whole has not yet discovered how to
formalize and institutionalize the knowledge and abilities of local management. If
operational capabilities are truly held at the local level, and no method exists to
appropriate and redeploy the abilities in new markets or products, the company will fail
to achieve synergies as a corporation, and local entities will be no better off from an
operational perspective then their locally owned competition. Many large companies
have successfully created operating systems that make the whole company better than the
sum of its parts. Focusing on the development of value delivery core competencies at the
corporate level will help to fully leverage the skills and talents possessed by local and
regional management as the company moves into new geographical and product markets.
The building materials market has been consolidating over the previous decade. No
player has established dominance as of yet. If BMC West wants to be a leader in this
industry, the company must act now to create two specific value delivery core
competencies: one in delivering an efficient build process to its customers, and another in
process improvement.
4.4.1. Competency in Delivering an Efficient Build Process to Customers
Some of BMC West's value delivery competencies are quite obvious. In the Houston
region, for instance, the company has the ability to offer same day delivery on orders
entered by 10:00am. Furthermore, they are able to offer two deliveries every day. A
customer's doors might arrive in the morning, and any materials ordered by 10:00am
would still arrive that afternoon. This represents a level of service that is unmatched by
BMC West's competitors, and local management attributes their steady increase in
market share to this offering.
The Houston millwork bends over backwards to satisfy the customer. All deliveries are
free, no matter how small the order. Customers can order more material than they think
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they will need, and the remaining material is picked up and credited back to the customer
on the next delivery to the site. If asked, management of the Lonestar millwork in
Houston would describe their core competency as providing an unparalleled level of
service.
Unfortunately, however, the ability to reliably schedule the delivery of a set of doors to
the morning or afternoon of a specific day remains elusive. Delivering the product on
time, every time, is perhaps the most important aspect of quality to a customer in the
building industry. Despite that, orders are entered into the production system with no
tracking of the effort required to complete the work on time. It is only the next day,
when the paperwork has been processed, that it becomes obvious to the production line
manager that too many doors have been scheduled for the day's production. Even then,
customers are only notified on the day they should receive their doors that the order will
be shipped late. Often, during the busier seasons, the backup of production on a Monday
puts the entire system behind schedule by half a day for the remainder of the week, only
getting back on schedule by Thursday or Friday. If Lonestar viewed its role as creating
the most efficient build process possible for its customer, rather than simply delivering a
high level of service, focus might be shifted towards those activities that result in on-time
deliveries and therefore tangible value in the customer's homebuilding process. It is very
possible that customers would readily trade the current offering of high cost ancillary
"services" provided by Lonestar for dependable and reliable scheduling of delivery dates.
On the SelectBuild side of the business, BMHC does seem to recognize the enormous
benefits to be reaped from a core competency in delivering a more efficient home
building process to its customers. SelectBuild has learned that many of the inefficiencies
that exist in a typical construction project involve material scheduling and delivery. The
theft or damage of raw material is a constant problem on jobsites, and the obvious
solution is to coordinate the delivery and installation of materials to avoid leaving them
sitting unattended or uninstalled for any period of time. To achieve this coordination,
SelectBuild has acquired or built a number of lumber and building materials supply
depots in an effort to coordinate delivery with the availability of labor.
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By viewing the creation of a more efficient build site as a core competency, BMC West
locations would be driven to attempt the same level of coordination. One of the best
ways to do this is to follow the SelectBuild lead and simply take over the installation
process. In this way, materials are delivered and installed at the same time and theft and
damage are significantly reduced. The Houston millwork locations do offer this service,
but the installation is currently outsourced to a third party. The contract installer does not
have the same focus on quality or on-time delivery that an internal group would have,
and therefore puts this line of business in jeopardy in the long run.
Despite the fact that the Houston locations do a very good job of pleasing the customer,
many of their advances have not been duplicated in any other BMC West locations. This
indicates that although the location possesses a capability in this area, the corporation
does not yet possess a core competency. Furthermore, their capabilities are fragile, as
they reside in the unique processes, culture, and minds of Houston's employees and
management. Without some institutionalization, the capability could very well be lost
when and if management retires or moves on.
4.4.2. Competency in Process Improvement
BMC West would also benefit greatly by creating a core competency in process
improvement. Overwhelming evidence exists to show that Lean Manufacturing
principles can significantly increase quality and speed, while at the same time decreasing
inventory and manufacturing costs. Other than isolated experiments at the local level, no
attempts have yet been made in the company to create a process around process
improvement. In fact, no guidelines or best practices even exist in the areas of business
processes, preventative maintenance, employee training, inventory policies, and other
activities at the core of the business. As the company grows, maintaining common
practices becomes more and more difficult. A process improvement methodology, led
from the corporate level, would serve to document, unify, and share the best practices
developed at the local level.
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The company has repeatedly tried and failed to institute best practices from the corporate
level. The most recent attempt seems doomed to the same fate, as many members on the
team believe it is a futile effort. A corporate-wide process improvement program, on the
other hand, would give locations the tools necessary to continually improve their own
operations, and structured knowledge sharing would help the locations converge on best
practices organically.
Anecdotally, in every industry, the companies that dominate have very formal processes,
cultures, and commitments to process improvement. Examples include Dell's pursuit of
minimal inventory, Toyota's production system, Wal*Mart's pioneering of cross
docking, RFID, and other warehousing technologies, Intel's copy exactly program, and
GE's lean six sigma. In other words, in every industry that has a clearly dominant player,
that company is distinguished by its dedication to relentless process improvement.
If BMHC hopes to lead the building industry toward a new business model, the company
must develop a system that allows it to leap ahead of its competition rather than simply
keeping pace with the rest of the industry. That capability does not yet exist.
4.5. Innovation Related Core Competencies
Innovation related core competencies are those that allow a company to continually
develop new products and services that are valued by its customers. For example, since
the release of the first iPod digital music player, Apple has shown that it has a well
developed core competency in bringing new products to market that its customers find
compelling. Furthermore, Apple continues to release a new version of its product on a
yearly basis and delivers exceedingly high quality each time. The ability to deliver new
26products year after year constitutes an innovation related core competency . It is likely
formed by the combination of many capabilities, including the ability to understand the
26 Apple can also be used to exemplify the other categories of core competencies. Apple's ability to
identify profitable locations for its retail stores would constitute a market access competency; and its ability
to offer iPod products that are etched with custom text and delivered to a customer within 48 hours would
constitute a value delivery competency.
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needs of the customer, the ability to engineer high quality products, the ability to
successfully transfer experimental manufacturing techniques into mass production, and a
culture obsessed with quality at all costs.
In the homebuilding industry, the majority of the product innovation occurs in one of two
areas; new products and materials, or new and more efficient homebuilding processes.
Suppliers are always searching for alternative technologies and materials that provide
their product with superior performance or lower cost. For example, Marvin, a large
window and door slab manufacturer, sells a line of technically advanced windows that
offer the beauty of stainable wood on the interior, and the durability of pre-finished
aluminum cladding on the exterior. Likewise, Masonite, one of the leading door slab
producers, offers a full line of fiberglass exterior doors that are virtually indistinguishable
from real wood. In the traditional (i.e. not manufactured) homebuilding market,
advances in materials and technology tend to come from suppliers rather than from
materials distribution companies or the homebuilders themselves.
Homebuilders, however, are often responsible for advances in the homebuilding process
in the form of efficiency improvements. The recent success of SelectBuild provides an
example of homebuilders experimenting with new operational methodologies and
business models in an attempt to improve the cost and quality of the final product.
As a materials distributor, it is very difficult for BMC West to create its own core
competencies around either of the two innovation areas discussed above. The company
lacks large scale product development resources and therefore cannot immediately
compete with window and door slab suppliers; any attempt to keep pace with the flood of
new products coming from these suppliers would be futile at best. Furthermore, the
company simply supplies materials to the jobsite and therefore does not exert much
influence on the homebuilding process, and does not immediately benefit from wringing
out efficiency gains. In short, BMC West is stuck in the middle of the value chain
without the power or resources necessary to bring innovation to the market. It would be
unwise to attempt to directly compete on innovation with either of the other layers in the
supply chain.
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4.5.1. Competency in New Product Introduction
At the same time, BMC West's position in the value chain does put it in the unique
position to create a core competency in introducing newly released products to the
market. The majority of BMC West's competitors (like BMC West themselves) have
very rigid catalogs of products, and limited ability to introduce new products to
customers outside of printed marketing material and expensive showrooms.
Large customers frequently demand that BMC West warehouses begin stocking a
particular line of products. The location may start carrying the product, but the smaller,
higher margin customers have no way of knowing that the product is available. A new
product introduction competency allows for the rapid introduction of new product
offerings to the full range of customers. Building this competency would likely require
an adaptable electronic catalog system that allows salespeople to effectively inform
smaller customers of new offerings. The catalog could have some built-in capabilities for
order entry or customer relationship management. Furthermore, an efficient system
might also include lean purchasing and inventory systems on the back end that allow
customers to very quickly change the product mix they offer, resulting in a corresponding
change in BMC West's stocking decisions and inventory levels.
In addition, each new product offering requires new manufacturing setups, new
procurement relationships, new part numbers, and a host of other internal processes that
slow its release to customers. A new product introduction competency would also
streamline the product development and release process. The introduction of multipoint
locks illustrates how BMC West could derive benefit from this competency. Multipoint
locks are a new alternative to the traditional deadbolt on exterior doors. They have a set
of three or more locking mechanisms, spaced evenly along the door, and are actuated by
a single knob. The product is far superior to the old technology, and some builders have
said that they could be selling nothing but multipoint locks at this point 27 . The
production manager at Lonestar has worked for months with lock suppliers, machinery
27 From a conversation with the Production Manager for Lonestar Millwork in Houston, Tx.
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vendors, and door slab suppliers in an effort to offer this new product. Unfortunately, it
is still stuck in the development phase because the production manager has numerous
responsibilities and cannot dedicate large amounts of time to this project, nor is there
standard machinery yet that can accommodate multipoint locks. Worse yet, he is
working in complete isolation and may be duplicating work occurring at other locations
throughout the company. The corporation as a whole does not currently possess any
capability that would aid in the quick delivery of this new product to market. If such a
capability existed, BMC West could establish a reputation for offering new products to
their customers before the competition.
A new product introduction competency would allow BMC West to respond to changing
customer needs with a speed and efficiency that is difficult to recreate. Developing the
competency may require the formation of a team dedicated to evaluating, testing, and
integrating new products. It might also include an internal process by which local
business managers and salespeople are educated about new product offerings from major
suppliers. It could also include an easily updated electronic visual catalog that is
available to salespeople on tablet PCs in the field, so customers could easily be shown the
benefits and costs of switching to new products. Ultimately it requires a concerted
cultural commitment from the organization to being the first to offer the latest product
advances to the customer.
4.6. Information System Capabilities
An organization's capabilities are the routines its members use, in combination with
resources, to accomplish specific tasks or goals. Capabilities are the building blocks that
when combined in unique ways create and support the core competencies in a company.
The Core Competency Model identifies four capabilities that the Information Services
group should possess in order to fully support the core competencies of the organization.
Planning Sophistication speaks to an ability to identify business priorities and deploy
resources in the most efficient way possible to achieve strategic objectives. This
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capability is critical in aligning the IS group's activities with business priorities
Systems Development Capability is the ability to effectively and efficiently deliver IT
projects on time and within budget. This capability is critical to building trust and
commitment between the IS group and the firm's business units. Support Maturity
ensures that the systems that are developed are properly utilized by end users. Help
desks and training materials fall into this category. Operations Capability refers to the
ability to provide a continuity of basic business operations to both internal and external
IS customers. A competency in this area implies that the organization's software and
hardware is reliable and secure29
These four capabilities form the basic framework for thinking about IS delivery and IT
investment. It is possible that other capabilities also exist that would assist in capturing
value from IT investment. Specific industries, corporate structures, or company cultures
may influence the selection and prioritization of capabilities. As BMHC critiques their
own capabilities in these four areas, the company should also make an effort to identify
any additional capabilities that should be added to the list.
To be truly beneficial to the organization, capabilities must support the core
competencies of the company. R&L show that simply possessing the above key
capabilities is positively correlated to the IS group's support of core competencies. For
practical and strategic planning purposes, however, a simple correlation is not enough.
Attention should be given to both to the degree of capability the organization possesses,
and the degree to which that capability ends up supporting the agreed upon core
competencies. In reality, the organization must ask both questions.
It is interesting to note that the four capabilities identified by the Core Competency
Model (Planning, Development, Support, and Operation) form a continuum that spans the
28 Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien, 245.
29 As an example illustrating the four key capabilities, imagine the implementation of a corporate email
system. Identifying an appropriate email server product that will meet the business's needs requires the
Planning Sophistication capability. Quickly implementing the email system requires a Systems
Development Capability. Training on the new system and services to reset passwords and solve other
customer problems requires Support Maturity. Finally, maintaining a high level of software availability
requires an ongoing Operations Capability.
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range from the beginning of an IT project cycle to the end. Likewise, the capabilities
cover the broad spectrum from strategic planning to tactical operation. The figure below
illustrates this concept.
< Strategic Planning - - - - - ---- ----
Planning Development Support Operation
Information Technology Product Development Cycle
Figure 5: The Four IT Capabilities
It is very difficult to say conclusively whether or not a company possesses a given
capability. Because they are not tangible assets, it is impossible to point to something
specific and quantifiable to prove its existence. Therefore, when analyzing the
capabilities of an organization, one must instead look for evidence of the exploitation of
the capability to produce an intended outcome. In this section, I point to some specific
events that illustrate the degree to which BMHC's IS department has succeeded or failed
in deploying each capability identified in the Core Competency Model.
4.6.1. Planning Sophistication
Planning sophistication is defined as the IS group's ability to identify and consolidate the
priorities of business units and other stakeholders in the organization. Furthermore, it
speaks to the ability of the organization to select those projects that will add the most
value to the corporation as a whole and deploy resources accordingly in an efficient
manner.
The first example concerns one of the projects with which I was involved, the Imigit
document imaging implementation. In March of 2006, BMC West acquired Home
Lumber and Millwork, and the new locations were put under the management of the
Houston region. One of the benefits of the acquisition was the fact that Home had a
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document imaging system and process that virtually eliminated the archiving of
paperwork from the office. By contrast, Lonestar Millwork had no such digital document
imaging solution. If all the paper generated daily in the warehouse was stacked, it would
likely reach six to eight feet.
Houston leadership saw the value in this document imaging system, and as soon as the
two millwork locations were using the same MRP system, they began the process of
converting Lonestar to the document imaging software. To do this, of course, resources
were requested from the IS group, and a project manager was assigned.
What is interesting from a planning sophistication standpoint is that the corporate IS
group already had a document imaging solution using a different, and relatively superior
piece of software. Despite having this solution, for whatever reason, they lacked the
resources necessary to deploy it in Houston. By demanding that Imigit be installed
immediately, Houston leadership tied up valuable resources duplicating a solution that
already existed. There may be many reasons for this series of events. Politically,
Houston is very powerful because it is one of the largest and most profitable millwork
locations in the organization. Practically, it was very important to implement a document
imaging solution in Houston, and given the situation at the time, it was probably the right
thing to do. Regardless of the reason, the decision and the resulting resource allocation
was not planned, rather it was born of the political and tactical realities that existed at the
time. In short, it was a reaction.
Likewise, on several occasions I saw the IS group reacting in a similar manner to the
requests of the business units. Toward the end of the internship, for instance, we decided
to undertake a project to implement the automatic generation of bar codes using the MRP
software. This would entirely automate the existing manual process that occupied a very
experienced employee for more than an hour every day. Initially this seemed to be a
simple change, but after further research it became obvious that it would require the
assistance of the group that oversaw the Bills of Materials in the MRP system. The
leader of that group already had a very good rapport with Houston management, and was
more than willing to have his team work with us to implement the solution.
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What was surprising from a planning sophistication standpoint was that the team leader
had almost absolute control over the projects his team worked on. In strategy literature,
there is a classic tradeoff between an organization's entrepreneurial energy and the
coordination of the various constituents. A sophisticated planning capability in the IS
group would seem to necessitate a high degree of coordination. It is not clear that
entrepreneurial energy is a desirable quality in the IT implementation teams. The fact
that this particular team had such autonomy implies that it came at the expense of
organizational coordination, and thus planning sophistication.
4.6.2. Development Capability
Development Capability is defined as the ability to effectively and efficiently deliver IT
projects on time and within budget. There are many indications that BMHC's IS group
possesses, or is in the process of developing, a strong development capability. At the
same time, there are some indications that the group still has major hurdles to overcome.
One of the most promising signs that the group is pursuing a development capability is
that the group has created a structured software development methodology, referred to
within the company as the Solution Delivery Methodology, or SDM process. More
importantly, the company seems to be using this process with success and improving it
with experience.
To deliver IT projects that meet the needs of the internal customer, known in the SDM as
the client, the IS group must have an understanding of the priorities and goals of the
business unit. As I will discuss in the resource section, the best way to achieve this
understanding is to build strong relationships with the business units. To this end,
BMHC created the role of the Business Systems Manager, or BSM. BMHC's SDM
documentation defines the roles and responsibilities in the following way:
The BSM...
* Requests and guides projects
" Insures client decision making
* Identifies project objectives
* Helps define business requirements
* Approves SDM deliverables
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* Receives status reports
* Is involved with changes to requirements, cost, schedule
* Ensures communication with Business Sponsor (Client)
* May function as a companion "Project Manager"
The BSM's day to day job is to develop relationships with the business units, and guide
them through the process of identifying priorities, clarifying requirements, and requesting
resources from the corporate IS department. The BSM's job is to function as an advocate
for the needs of the business unit, as well as to communicate the broader corporate
priorities back to the client. In many ways, the BSM's role is half project manager, half
politician.
The BSM role, if supported and empowered by leadership and given to the right person,
is a very powerful way to create alignment between the business unit goals and the
actions taken by the corporate IS department. The fact that IS leadership has recognized
the need for this role bodes very well for the cultivation of a development capability. In
reality, however, the BSM role on the BMC West side of the business is being
underutilized and is for the most part ineffective. I found this to be true when I began
working on my first project during the internship. After developing the documentation
and requirements for the project, I submitted a request to the IS department. At no time
did anyone in the local organization instruct me to call upon the BSM to help navigate
the process. Furthermore, as I made my request, no one in the corporate IS group
referred me to the BSM either. Only much later did I learn that in theory it would have
been better to work with the BSM. Although the position exists, it is almost completely
ignored and dismissed by the organization. Despite corporate leadership's strong belief
in the value of the BSM role, it has been very slow to rectify the situation.
Another key example illustrating the gap between the current state and the preferred state
of development capability is the Warehouse Management System (WMS) project in
Houston. While the company is sufficiently competitive in the millwork industry, the
operational processes used to drive manufacturing are a decade old at best. Paper based
work orders track the progress of each order through the production system. Production
scheduling is significantly limited, if not impossible, as all orders are printed to hard copy
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and placed in an unsorted stack reaching eight to twelve inches daily. What's more, a
small number of orders simply vanish from the system on a daily basis because their
paperwork is lost or misplaced.
The WMS project was initiated by Houston's regional management in the third quarter of
2006 with the hiring of a project manager with expertise in the installation of the
proposed system. The project quickly reached high priority within the company, and is
currently the third project listed on the BMC West IT dashboard. The original go-live
date for this project was March of 2007. As of April 2007, the project is stalled at the
beginning phases. The project is so far behind, for example, that one of the first
milestones, the installation of wireless network hardware necessary to implement bar
coding on the shop floor, is now scheduled for installation in early April, a full month
after the project was originally supposed to finish 30 . Examples like this illustrate that,
despite the existence of very detailed and promising development methodologies and
roles like the BSM, the company has a long way to go to achieve their development
capability goals.
4.6.3. Support Maturity
Support Maturity ensures that IT systems are properly utilized by end users. A mature
support system includes documentation, training materials, help desks, and online
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) pages. A key aspect of support maturity is user
awareness. Users should know where to go to get help, and should be satisfied with the
service they receive.
30 After writing this section, a conversation with a key executive provided more information on the delays
in the implementation of the WMS. Much of the delay may have come from the Houston business unit's
desire to focus on the integration of the new Home Lumber and Home Millwork locations. In addition,
BMHC's IS group received incorrect information from the WMS software vendor at the beginning of the
project indicating that the current version of the MRP would be compatible. In fact, the MRP upgrade,
scheduled to begin in late 2006, was required for the WMS to operate properly. The MRP upgrade was
completed in April of 2007 and the WMS project is now fully underway. In addition, the BSM roll and
associated processes have been refined in an effort to more effectively capture the potential benefits of
BSM involvement in business unit requests.
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One sign that BMHC is making strides toward support maturity is the presence of a
highly responsive help desk staff. I used the help desk on several occasions to fix
computer connection issues or request access to reports in the MRP system. The staff
was always helpful and polite.
On the other hand, there is some confusion about the role of the help desk in responding
to requests from local users. Many business unit locations have an on-site IS
representative. This person manages the local network and serves as the liaison between
the corporate IS group and the business unit on software and hardware issues. Typically
a user will go to this representative with questions and problems.
The corporate IS department, however, has the explicit goal of encouraging users to
contact the help desk directly with IT requests. Unfortunately, the underlying help desk
processes fail to align with this goal. On one occasion, I created a "help ticket" to
request access to a report in the MRP system. The requested report was not particularly
sensitive; rather it was simply deactivated in my account. The help desk software
forwarded my request to a corporate representative, who had no way of knowing if I had
the authority to view the report. The representative then forwarded the ticket to the
junior of the two local IS representatives in Houston. The junior IS rep asked me what I
needed it for, but did not know if he had the authority to approve the request, so he in
turn forwarded it to the more senior IS rep in Houston. The senior IS rep repeated the
conversation with me concerning the purpose of the report. He was ready to authorize
the access, but was unable to do so himself because local representatives do not have the
ability to modify user settings. Instead he contacted the corporate help desk
representative with the proper authorization, and only then was the corporate help desk
able to give me access to the report. The following diagram illustrates the transaction.
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Figure 6: Requesting new access from the Help Desk
The inefficiency in this situation resulted from the structure of the system, and not from
the lack of effort by any one person. Help desk requests are directly routed to the
corporate level and therefore the local IS reps were unaware that a request had been
made. Corporate level help desk personnel do not have the authority to approve changes
to user accounts, yet they are the only ones with the actual ability to modify user settings.
A far more usable system would look something like the following:
~Service Des
Corproate IS s
Local IS IT #11
Client
Client Client
Figure 7: A revised Help Desk workflow
In this proposed system, help desk requests are routed first to the local IS rep. The IS rep
then forwards to the corporate rep if necessary. Experienced local IS reps are given the
authority and ability to make some changes to users accounts, but the more sensitive
reports may only be activated by a corporate representative. In the event that a local IS
rep does not have the appropriate level of experience to authorize a specific change to a
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user account, he or she simply forwards the request to the corporate level. In this way a
request is routed efficiently, minimizing the effort necessary to satisfy it.
The fact that BMHC has a functioning and competent help desk shows that corporate
leadership understands the importance of support maturity. On the other hand, the
continuing confusion over the purpose of the help desk, as well as the inefficiency of the
help desk processes, indicates a need for the continued development of support
capabilities.
BMHC's support capabilities would also benefit from improvements in software training.
The MRP system is extremely complicated and requires users to memorize strings of
letters to navigate to reports or data entry screens. For instance, from the main menu a
user enters OEET to bring up the order entry screen. From that screen, each of the
function keys (Fl-F12) provides a different functionality, and additional functions are
available by using combinations of keys. After six months at BMC West, I never became
truly proficient at using the system. The only training available is a small book listing
some of the more common commands. The vast majority of training occurs through
conversations among coworkers.
Employee training on the shop floor and in the office is equally weak. Although this is
the domain of the Human Resources organization, the IS group could help the situation
by providing a means to create published training materials.
BMHC should be commended for setting up the infrastructure necessary to support the IT
systems they develop. That being said, the company should recognize the need to
develop and refine these support mechanisms in order to take full advantage of the
technology they have.
4.6.4. Operations Capability
Operations Capability refers to the ability of the IS group to provide continuity of basic
business operations to the IS clients. In other words, a capability in this area means that
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email and web services are rarely interrupted, MRP and ERP systems have high levels of
"up-time," and errors are recovered from quickly.
BMHC is already maturing their operations capability. Late last year, the company
consolidated its servers in a hosting facility in Las Vegas, Nevada. The company is
moving quickly to implement a single version of the MRP system across its business
units. The IS group maintains strict hardware and security policies, and all software is
kept current with frequent updates through networked management utilities.
There is, however, a company-wide apprehension about the eventual upgrade to the next
version of the MPR software (SX.e). This upgrade will be either very expensive because
of the hundreds of modifications that must be ported to the new version, or, very
disruptive because underlying business processes will be forced to change if the company
decides not to pay for the transfer of these modifications.
Other lumber and millwork operations use the same software, but do so within the
bounds of the systems program, making only a few dozen modifications. It is the
hundreds of modifications that make upgrading difficult and expensive. Moreover, at
BMHC the modifications are made on the whims of individual business units, and
thereby threaten the operations capability of the entire organization. To minimize this
threat, BMHC should either find a new software vendor that better meets their needs, or
shift the company culture away from constantly modifying software. The short term
benefits of these modifications, i.e. the ability to avoid changing local business processes
to work within the bounds of the software, must be weighed against the long term costs
and large scale disruptions incurred by having hundreds of software modifications. By
requiring that local business units adapt their processes to work within the capabilities of
the software, BMHC will align local business processes with company best practices. In
so doing, BMHC can avoid finding itself in the same position three years from now when
it upgrades to the next version of SX.e, which would demonstrate a much stronger
operational capability.
56
In short, operational capability is the fundamental capability necessary for the success of
an IS department and its IT infrastructure. Without reliability in the infrastructure, all the
strategic planning, careful and focused development, and quick and efficient support will
not ensure the delivery of the necessary support to the core competencies within the
organization.
4.7. Information System Resources
Resources are assets, both tangible and intangible, that a company owns and controls.
The organization's resources and routines are the fundamental building blocks that, when
combined in unique ways, form capabilities. Combinations of still more resources and
capabilities form core competencies.
IS literature identifies three key resources necessary for the development of the
Information Systems capabilities listed in the previous section. Partnership Quality, or
the quality of the relationship between the IS group and business units and IT vendors, is
critically important to the strategic alignment between the actions of the IS group and the
goals of the organization. IT Infrastructure Flexibility enables a firm to deliver IT
solutions quickly and efficiently. It enables data to flow to those who need it for
management or process improvement purposes, and it allows new technologies to be
added to the existing system without compromising system availability, reliability, or
support. Underlying all other resources and capabilities, Human Capital encompasses
the knowledge and experience of the personnel involved in IT projects. Professional and
interpersonal skills, and deep technical and industry-specific skill are critical to the
development of IS capabilities.
4.7.1. Partnership Quality
An organization is fundamentally a group of people whose individual relationships
contribute to a prevailing culture that is characterized by unspoken assumptions,
agreements, and expectations that govern the daily routines of the employees. These
relationships, when open and positive, assist in the creation of sustained alignment
between the corporate IS group's actions and the local business unit's objectives.
57
Partnership quality is a measure of the quality of the relationships between the IS group
and the groups it interacts with, primarily the business units and the software/hardware
vendors. These relationships represent stocks of goodwill that can be filled or depleted
through ongoing interactions. During my internship, I had the opportunity to observe the
internal relationships between BMC West's IS group and their local business units.
My observations over a six month period revealed that the relationships between BMC
West's IS group and its individual business units vary a great deal depending on the
degree to which the groups have worked together in the past. The managers I spoke to
from business units outside the Houston region had either neutral or positive things to say
about their relationship with IS, but they admittedly had very little experience actually
working with the IS group. Management in Houston, however, has a more extensive
history with corporate IS and had much more negative feelings toward the corporate IS
group.
One source of bad feeling arose from Houston's experience with the corporate IS group
when Lonestar Millwork converted to the SX.e MRP system. This was the first
installation of the SX.e system within the company and, as with any completely new
software package, there were many unforeseen problems and challenges. The changes to
the system resulted in numerous orders shipping late, and even worse, the loss of several
orders entirely, which was discovered only when customers called to check on the status
of their order. For a year, management in the Houston region worked closely with
customers to keep them with Lonestar, and fixed the bugs in the new order process one
by one. In my conversations with Houston's management, they described how at the
time they thought there was a very real chance the location would go out of business that
year. Every single one of the managers admitted that he or she seriously considered
leaving the company because there seemed to be no end in sight to their troubles.
This experience severely damaged the goodwill between BMC West's corporate IS
department and the local Houston management. Further incidents in which the IS
department failed to support the Houston business units added fuel to the fire. For
example, during the conversion of Home Millwork to SX.e in June, the conversion team
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informed the corporate IS team that the printing of bar codes on order paperwork was a
necessary step for go-live. The IS group assured them it would not be a problem at all.
As the week of go-live approached, the conversion team in Houston grew nervous
because bar coding remained non-functional and the appropriate printers still had not
been ordered. The already delayed go-live date had been set for a Friday; on Wednesday
or Thursday of that week the corporate staff informed Houston that there was, in fact, a
problem with bar coding and that several $4000 bar-code-capable printers would need to
be ordered and delivered overnight to the location at Houston's expense. Although the
go-live proceeded the following week with the new printers installed, this experience
reinforced Houston management's belief in the incompetence of the corporate IS group.
I do not recount this story in an effort to deride the IS group for past mistakes, but rather
to illustrate the dramatic difference that can be achieved when more effort is put on
partnership quality. For example, the IS group was tremendously successful with the
implementation of the Imigit document imaging software in Houston in September of
2006. The corporate IS group, located in Boise, assigned a project manager from the
Boise team to lead the project. This project manager made a concerted effort to travel to
Houston during the project and to over-communicate the status of the project and the
responsibilities of everyone involved through emails, conference calls, physical meetings,
and other project status documentation. The project manager worked very closely with a
local champion and served as the point of contact in Boise for any problems. The project
manager was given sufficient formal authority to correct problems as they arose. In
short, the project went very smoothly, and the relationship between the IS group and
Houston management was significantly strengthened through this experience.
Unfortunately, much of the animosity that still exists today between Houston and the
corporate IS group in Boise has its roots in the stressful series of events surrounding the
original SX.e conversion in Houston. Informal conversations with leaders at the
corporate level indicate that Houston is not the only location with a strained relationship.
Houston's experience with Imigit, however, shows that the relationship can be improved
with effort, and moreover, that projects can run much more smoothly when that
relationship is stronger and the communication is free flowing. Although it will be a
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slow process, with each new interaction at the local level BMHC's IS group will be given
the opportunity to strengthen the relationship with individual business units.
4.7.2. Infrastructure Flexibility
Infrastructure flexibility speaks to the ability of the IT infrastructure to move data and
information to those who need it for management or process improvement purposes. It is
also the ability to efficiently add new technologies to the hardware and software of the
existing system without compromising system availability, reliability, or support. The
most recent wisdom and research in strategy tells us that it is the corporations that are
adaptable to the changing business climate, rather than those that simply possess
depreciating resources, that have the strongest competitive advantage. Flexibility in the
IT system is imperative to a company's ability to improve and reinvent themselves as the
competitive landscape shifts.
BMHC has made great progress in the past three years on this front. Application and
data servers were recently consolidated in Las Vegas in a reliable and secure data center.
The network is very secure and strict policies prohibiting personal software and
computers from the network are enforced. Software packages like Citrix and WebEx that
allow for the quick implementation and distribution of training materials, software, and
documentation are in place, even if not fully taken advantage of.
Executive leadership understands that the establishment of a strong IT foundation is one
of the key resources necessary to build the capabilities and core competencies discussed
above. The company is to be commended for their progress in this area.
4.7.3. Human Capital
Human capital is the stock of talent and experience that a company possesses. In the
resource based view of the firm, an organization is, at its essence, defined by its people,
routines, and resources. An individual person is typically not considered a resource
because he or she is not owned or controlled by the corporation. For this reason, it may
seem odd at first to think of human capital as a resource. Nevertheless, there is a subtle
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distinction between an individual person and the resource of human capital. Human
capital is the collective talent in a company. It is the tangible outcome of the
corporation's capability to recruit, develop, and retain that talent. As a collective, it is
basically "owned and controlled" by the company, even if individual employees are not.
It is somewhat fragile, however, as the capability to retain talent can be quickly and
severely undermined in an organization that fails to empower, respect, pay, or otherwise
reward the talent that exists.
Human capital is critical to building and improving routines, capabilities, resources, and
core competencies. It is the fundamental building block. Without the appropriate human
capital, other resources like infrastructure flexibility and partnership quality are
impossible to achieve in the long run.
BMHC has been growing very quickly over the past decade. As the amount and scope of
work increase, the stock of human capital thins and the once strong capabilities to recruit
and retain become strained. Growth, by definition, requires a constant influx of new
human capital if it is to be sustained. Unfortunately, from a human capital standpoint, I
am concerned that BMHC and BMC West have not been keeping up with the demands of
their own growth.
The events around the recent hiring of a project manager exemplify my concerns. In the
third quarter of 2006, the corporate IS group hired an experienced project manger to
implement a warehouse management system (WMS) package. Corporate IS instructed
the new manager start his project at the Houston location. This WMS is arguably the
most important technological undertaking currently occurring at BMC West. The system
lays the foundation for further process improvement steps that could easily knock double
digit percentages off the cost of doing business in millworks like Lonestar. The
implementation of this software combined with changing the culture around process
improvement is the first fundamental step toward creating a true core competency, which
in turn will afford BMC West a sustainable competitive advantage in millwork
operations.
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Management in the Houston region recognized WMS as a critical capability that the
company should pursue and identified the project manager as someone who is highly
qualified to develop that capability. Despite the importance of building an expertise in
warehouse management, the hiring of this project manager was not aggressively pursued
at the corporate level. Houston management confessed that at some point they seriously
considered simply offering the project manager a job at the regional level, even though
the region could not afford to retain his talent without spreading the cost over other
locations, in an effort to get him on board as soon as possible.
When the project manager was finally hired at the corporate level, he was put in a
position with no formal authority in the organization. The existing bureaucratic culture
and the IS group's lack of accountability to the project made it very difficult for him to
keep the project on schedule. In fact, the ongoing frustrations faced by the project
manager are so apparent that Houston management has expressed its concern he may
likely leave the company once the WMS is installed in Houston and his obligations to the
Houston management, to whom he feels loyal, are fulfilled. This example shows that
BMC West may not fully appreciate critical value of human capital in the setting of a
rapidly growing company 3 1
31 There have been many changes at the company since my internship completed in mid December, 2006.
The project manager responsible for WMS has been promoted to the position of Director of Inventory and
Logistics and has been given the formal authority necessary to bring his project to successful completion.
This and other personnel changes and new hires in the corporate IS group are very encouraging signs that
BMHC management has identified and is acting on some of the deficiencies that previously existed in the
area of human capital.
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5. Conclusion and Recommendations
5.1. Overview
This thesis analyzes BMC West using The Core Competency Model, focusing
specifically on how this model applies to the Information Systems group within the
company. I have systematically gone through and highlighted the strengths of the IS
group and, based on the model, pointed out areas in need of improvement. I believe the
recommendations I make throughout this thesis are key to the continued success of the IS
group.
At the same time, because the Information Services group exists to support the core
competencies of the larger organization, it can only be successful if the organization as a
whole understands what its core competencies are. Currently, those core competencies
are not clearly communicated or agreed upon throughout the company. Many of the
problems that exist today might very well be symptoms of the fact that different parts of
the organization are moving in different directions. In the last few paragraphs of this
document, I would like to discuss some of these larger issues that need to be addressed in
order for improvements within the IS group to succeed.
Despite my access to company leadership, as an intern working in a single business unit
my perspective of the corporation is essentially from the bottom up. Some of my
conclusions may seem incorrect or uninformed when viewed from the other direction, i.e.
from corporate leadership looking down. My sincere hope is that BMHC's leadership
will consider these recommendations and understand their source. It is just as important
to understand why someone from the bottom of the organization might come to these
conclusions as it is to determine whether or not they are fully correct in their
interpretation.
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5.2. Create and Communicate a Vision for BMC West
During this internship, I had the opportunity to work with an extremely experienced
group of people in one of the biggest and best millwork facilities in the company. The
location's rising market share shows they clearly offer a compelling service to their
customers. I was able to see first-hand the core competencies that Lonestar Millwork has
successfully created over the years in Houston.
The completion of this thesis, however, prompted the question "What are BMC West's
core competencies?" This question was much more difficult to answer. After a great
deal of thought, I concluded that BMC West is not really doing anything at the corporate
level that differentiates it from its competitors. Conversations with business unit leaders
confirm that there are doubts as to the value the corporate structure delivers. Ultimately,
BMC West does not seem to have a global vision for what it currently is or where it
wants to take the lumber and building materials industry. Without a unifying vision, each
business unit will continue to make decisions based on optimizing their local concerns
without respect to the rest of the company, resulting in the loss of the organization's
synergies.
The Core Competency Model introduced in this thesis is aimed at the Information
Services group in Boise, but it relies on the organization as a whole identifying its core
competencies, i.e. those skills and resources that differentiate BMC West from its
competitors. Once the current and desired core competencies have been identified and
communicated to all parts of the company, the entire organization can then focus its
energy in the same direction and make decisions that move all parts of the company
toward these goals. This shared vision would produce the organizational alignment
necessary to make BMC West finally add up to more than the sum of its parts.
Thinking in terms of core competencies is only one of the many ways to approach
corporate strategy. Ultimately, it is not important for BMC West to choose this particular
approach. It is imperative, however, that the company figure out what it is good at,
figure out what it wants to be good at, and communicates that message from the top of
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the organization to the truck loaders on the docks of Lonestar Millwork. If the
company fails to do this, a competitor will eventually rise that can, and BMC West will
be at risk of losing everything it has gained.
5.3. Create an Operations Center of ExceHence
The Information Services group at BMHC is in the process of building a sophisticated IT
infrastructure. Development occurs in a centralized location (Boise, Idaho) and all
modifications to the system are, in theory, regulated so as not to conflict with existing
operations. Notwithstanding the exceptions I have presented, the duplication of efforts is
minimized. Communications and planning are coordinated through a hierarchy of
committees and the SDM process serves to unify the implementation of projects across
the company.
By contrast, the operations organization is not well aligned. Every business unit has its
own way of operating and that individuality is condoned or even supported, most notably
by the IS group modifying the MRP at every impasse. Product development efforts are
conducted at the local level without any real method of sharing the lessons learned.
Innovative processes, software, or business models are stalled at the local level, and only
shared through word of mouth with other parts of the organization. Occasionally an
enterprising business unit leader might investigate further, but the infrastructure used to
share capabilities is primitive.
BMHC has now taken its place as a Fortune 1000 company. Unfortunately, many of the
underlying processes lag behind other companies of similar size. Large companies like
BMHC often develop "operating systems" that guide and focus the decisions of business
units. By drawing upon the wealth of experiences across the entire organization, BMHC
can establish guidelines to help local managers with process improvement, making
acquisitions, and developing products.
BMC West should create a center of excellence that serves as a focal point for the
advances made in the company by the business units. It is very exciting, for instance,
that Houston employees are developing the ability to sell multipoint locks. To derive the
65
most benefit from this experience, the Houston employees should be reporting to a
product development group in Seattle that distributes the new technology to the other
business units once it is developed. That same group could then analyze the opportunity
and determine how much it is worth, potentially allowing the company as a whole to
allocate more resources to the project than the employee at the Houston branch can
justify to his or her management team.
In addition to product development, this center of excellence group could monitor and
help distribute advances in process improvement, millwork machinery, installed services,
and other relevant topics in the lumber and millwork business.
Most importantly, this entity would need to exert real political power within the
organization. First, they would need to be the final word on operational issues at the
local level. Business unit managers would need to acquiesce to this groups ruling on
modifications to the suggested best practices, for instance. Second, the group would need
to work with the IS group to mutually create a single vision for the technological
direction of the company.
The operations group should follow the lead of the IS organization and create a
headquarters in Seattle that truly leads the operations organization. Regional and
business unit managers currently feel as much (if not more) "led" by the IS organization
than they do by the leadership in Seattle. The new version of SX.e should be installed in
Seattle first so leadership has a chance to use it and understand its benefits and
limitations before converting the rest of the company. The Warehouse Management
System may be installed first in Houston, but the installation should be led by the
operations organization, not the IS group. The benefits of WMS are minimal without the
reengineering of business processes, and the proposed Operations Center of Excellence
should be framing that process.
Not all development must come from this location, but it can serve as the hub where
information is collected and disseminated to the other locations. Currently, the
operations organization is decentralized and most of the power in the company is shared
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by the larger lumber and millwork regions. The centralization of the operations
organization is critical to the development of capabilities and core competencies by the
company.
5.4. Build a World Class Process Improvement Capability
The most important thing BMC West could do is to undertake a serious effort to create a
process improvement capability within the organization. It is listed as my third
recommendation only because the first two steps are necessary prerequisites for
effectively accomplishing this third and vital one.
As students of business and operations, Leaders for Manufacturing Fellows are exposed
to a wide array of industries and companies. We become very familiar with the operating
principles of some of the worlds most preeminent companies. While each has unique
industry forces, operating methodologies, business models, and leadership styles, there is
one factor that is almost always present in the companies that dominate their respective
industries; each of these companies has an almost religious dedication to their version
of a process improvement method.
Research shows that industries go through cycles of consolidation and disintegration32
The lumber and building materials industry is currently in the process of consolidation.
In the past, small local or regional competitors simply lived with inefficiencies in their
operations. In the new business climate, larger consolidated materials suppliers will
bring their massive economies of scale to bear, wringing out those inefficiencies using
process improvement methodologies to develop new processes and quickly disseminate
them through the business. BMC West must begin developing this capability now,
before other larger material suppliers succeed at doing the same. By the time a single
dominant player becomes apparent, it will be too late to play catch up.
BMC West's current answer to this problem is to create a best practices committee.
Unfortunately, the majority of the committee members feel they are completely
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32 Fine.
ineffectual due to the pro-business-unit political climate the company has perpetuated.
Furthermore, none of the company's locations are currently operating at an obviously
higher level of efficiency, so it is very difficult to sell a new system to a business unit
manager that believes he or she is doing a decent job already.
Instead, BMC West should use its Operations Center of Excellence to create a process
improvement methodology and a model location that shows the substantial efficiencies
that can be gained by adopting the process. An internal group needs to be developed that
not only has the ability to improve processes, but has the entrepreneurial drive necessary
to go to locations and teach the process to them as well. By creating visibility around this
group, picking the right incentives for plant managers that align their motivations behind
process improvement, and adapting IT to fit with the process improvement solutions,
local leadership will end up fighting for who gets the process improvement team's
attention next. To truly create best practices in the organization, leadership must create a
cultural pull from the bottom up rather than attempting to force it from the top down.
5.5. Create Synergies or Sell BMC West
After spending six months working with BMC West, it is apparent that corporate
resources are being stretched in opposing directions by the two halves of the business,
BMC West and SelectBuild. BMC West is a traditional, commoditized building material
supplier whose margins are thin and whose competition is fierce. The corporation has
essentially stopped investing in BMC West's growth, focusing instead on the other half
of the business. SelectBuild, on the other hand, represents an exciting new business
model in residential construction. It is growing quickly through acquisitions, and
commands much of the corporate management's attention and energy.
In Information Technology, BMC West is focused on creating rigid and robust MRP
software that will satisfy the needs of the very mature millwork and lumber business. By
contrast, SelectBuild requires a fast and flexible IT infrastructure led by an IS group that
is willing to take the risks necessary to create applications for an entirely new industry
and business model. The two cultures and goals are fundamentally different, and
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arguably incompatible. It is unfair to BMC West that the IS resources are busy
delivering the latest and greatest products to the company's golden child, and it is unfair
to SelectBuild to burden the company with the infrastructural weight of a large, slow
materials business.
In his book, The Innovators Dilemma, Clayton Christensen describes in detail the way
new "disruptive" technologies or business processes end up dominating an industry33.
He points out that traditional incumbents are often powerless to stop the industry shift
because sound business decisions that lead to higher profit margins end up propelling the
shift in the market and sealing the eventual fate of the incumbent.
One day, strategy theorists may look back at SelectBuild's business model and recognize
it as a disruption in the industry. The company is currently working with the large
homebuilders and offering them a service that promises to take over some of their most
complicated and least profitable business, the homebuilding itself. Over time, however,
SelectBuild may be able to take more and more of this business until the company is
asking itself, "Why aren't we just buying land and building our own houses on it?" At
that point, homebuilders will have been divorced from the actual building process for so
long that they are incapable of stopping the shift in the market.
3 The US steel industry offers a perfect example of a disruptive technology. Traditional steel mill
technology consisted of massive, dirty, coal fired forges. Mini-mill technology promised a small,
comparatively clean, electric arc fired solution. Mini-mills were cheaper to operate and required less
capital to build, however, the steel they produced was of poor quality. The rebar used for concrete
construction was the only product they could feasibly manufacture. Traditional steel mills, on the other
hand, hated the rebar business. Margins were slim and steel quality, the metric traditional mills competed
on, was unimportant. Mini-mills quickly established themselves as niche players making rebar.
Traditional mills happily relinquished the business as it allowed them to focus on higher margin business.
Unfortunately for traditional mills, mini-mills used the rebar business to move along the learning curve and
were eventually able to make slightly higher quality steel for use in steel plate. Steel plate had become the
worst performing product line for traditional mills, and again they happily relinquished the business. This
process continued until mini-mills completely dominated the US steel industry, and traditional plants were
put out of business. None of the traditional steel manufacturers were able to make the leap to mini-mill
technology. By the time the incumbents knew what was happening, it was too late; mini-mills were too far
down the cost-learning curve and traditional mills could not catch up.
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One of the most interesting aspects of disruptive technologies is the fact that traditional
incumbents are rarely able to make the jump to the new business model. The metrics and
technology they compete on are simply not applicable in the new business climate. By
maintaining BMC West, the corporation is forced to become schizophrenic. Decisions
that are good for BMC West may not be good for SelectBuild and vice versa. One
company represents the traditional homebuilding model and the other represents the
future. BMC West slows SelectBuild's growth and maneuverability and jeopardizes its
potential to truly disrupt the traditional homebuilding industry.
I do believe there are significant synergies to be captured in the combination of the two
sides of the business. At this point, however, those synergies are completely non-
existent. The markets in which BMC West competes successfully could serve as
jumping off points for SelectBuild. Houston, for instance, installs exterior doors for
some of its clients using a third party installer. SelectBuild could take over this
installation business with a small group of people and use it to build a bigger business in
the area. SelectBuild has duplicated resources and built its own set of lumberyards on the
west coast because the two companies have failed to effectively work together. In fact, it
very well may be that the difficulties faced by BMHC in getting the two sides of the
business to cooperate is simply evidence of the typical friction experienced by incumbent
companies trying to pioneer disruptive technologies. At this point, corporate leadership
has made the decision to let the two companies drift further apart rather than forcing them
to build synergies together.
As difficult as it would be for the organization, my final recommendation is that BMHC
seriously consider the degree to which they are capturing value from the possession of
both BMC West and SelectBuild. There is no doubt that the combination of integrated
labor and efficient materials logistics could prove unbeatable in the homebuilding
industry. Unfortunately, the corporation has simply failed to realize any of those
potential synergies. The relationship between the two sides of the business is getting
more distant, not closer as time goes on. The sharing of resources between the two
companies is unfair to both, and truly holds each back in its own way. If BMHC cannot
take immediate and concrete steps toward capturing value from the combination of the
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two companies, I would suggest that leadership considers selling the lumber and building
materials side of the business. Some of the better locations could be sold to SelectBuild
as entry points into new markets, and the rest to an outside interest. The cash gained
from the sale could be used to further grow in the area of integrated labor to national
homebuilders, or to develop a more complete and integrated materials delivery
infrastructure under SelectBuild management. By taking this drastic step, the corporation
as a whole would be more free to define its core competencies from the top to the bottom,
rather than trying to operate in two distinct marketplaces, one traditional and one
disruptive.
5.6. Conclusion
The suggestions above are outside of the scope and control of the Information Services
group. However, I take it as a given that the role of the IS group is to support the core
competencies of the organization. Currently, the definition of the greater organization's
core competencies remains unarticulated at the local level. The result is a company
where strategic decisions at the top are resisted and misunderstood at the bottom and
support groups like IS are stuck in the middle serving multiple stakeholders with
disparate goals. I believe that the Information Services group can only become world
class if it is supporting a company with a clearly defined mission and vision in its market.
The suggestions above are intended to help solve this more fundamental issue that will
necessarily limit IS group's ability to improve.
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6. Appendix - Millwork Technology and Processes
6.1. Millwork Terminology
This section defines some common terms in the millwork business.
Casing/Molding 0
Glass Insert 0,..0
Hinge Pocket
Door Slab
Header
Jamb
Figure 8: Door terminology
Bore - A bore is the hole on a door panel where a doorknob is installed. Doors are often
sold as single or double bore, denoting the presence of one or two holes. A double bore
door traditionally would be installed with a doorknob and a deadbolt.
Cutout - On an exterior door, and less frequently on an interior door, a window is
installed in the door. The cutout is the hole in the door panel that accommodates the
window. The window is referred to as an Insert.
Jamb - A doorjamb is the frame around a door that the hinges attach to, and the door
latching mechanism mates with. Pre-hung doors are installed in frames of differing jamb
widths.
Panel - A panel can refer to two items. A door panel is the raw door, without a frame,
before it is "hung". A panel can also refer to an inset rectangle of wood, normally used
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Cutout
Bore
for decoration, on a doors surface. For instance, a door might be called a "six panel" if it
has six decorative rectangles on its surface.
Slab - Slab is another word for a door without a frame.
Molding or Casing - Molding and casing are used interchangeably to refer to the
decorative trim that surrounds a door, window, or other architectural feature.
Sill - A sill is the bottom of a door frame, particularly on an exterior door. Often they
are aluminum and incorporate a strip flexible rubber, called a sweep, to keep air and
debris from blowing under the door.
Insert - See cutout.
Transom - A transom is a rectangular frame that sits on top of a door frame. Often a
transom will have glass in it. Older buildings often incorporated hinged transoms that
could be opened to allow air flow when the door is closed.
Sidelight - A sidelight is a frame on one side or the other of a door frame. Often a
sidelight will contain decorative glass.
6.2. Door Assembly
Feed door onto Create cutout Route bore and Install Build frame Attach casing
production line for glass insert hinge pockets glass insert and molding
Figure 9: The pre-hung door assembly process
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The production process by which door panels are converted into pre-hung door units is
shown in the figure above. In a production facility the size of Lonestar Millwork in
Houston, these steps occur on a manually paced assembly line using automated door
assembly equipment. The following description is for a metal or fiberglass exterior unit,
however, the basic process is the same for other types of door units.
Before production begins, door slabs are grouped by order and stacked on wheeled
dollies or buggies up to 35 units high. The buggy is brought to the Door Handler/Feeder
machine. The Door Handler/Feeder automatically picks door slabs off the stack and
places them on the main conveyer for assembly. When the current stack of door slabs is
exhausted, a new buggy is wheeled into position.
After a door is placed on the conveyer, it is moved to a machine called the Door-Light
Router. This machine cuts a rectangular hole in the door for a pre assembled glass
window insert. After the door-light is cut out, two workers install the glass window
insert.
The slab then moves to the Hinge Router where the bores and hinge pockets in both the
door slab and the hinge-sidejamb are routed. Various locations have different levels of
automation, but in Houston's case, all three or four hinge pockets are routed
simultaneously and the operator follows with a screw machine, called a six-shooter or
eight-shooter, that attaches the hinges by simultaneously inserting six or eight self-
drilling screws. Hinges can be installed in approximately three seconds per hinge.
After the hinges are attached, the slab moves to a Frame Assembler. The operators insert
the lock-side jamb, header, and sill, and the Frame Assembler clamps the doorframe in
place. The operators verify that all jambs are aligned and the machine uses air-actuated
staple guns to finish the jamb assembly.
After the jamb is assembled, the door rolls to its final step. Casing and brick mold are
attached to one side of the frame, while the casing for the other side of the frame is bound
together and stapled to the side of the frame. The door is then lifted to its upright
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position using a lifting table, and is moved to a door buggy waiting nearby. When the
door buggy is full, it is put in a storage location until its doors are selected for delivery.
6.3. Millwork Order Processing
The following section describes the order entry, order processing, production, and
shipping of millwork products at the Lonestar Millwork and Home Millwork in Houston,
Texas. Many of the procedures would be similar in other locations with minor variations.
Orders fall into two categories: assembled items and stock items. Assembled goods are
pre-hung doors, mantels, windows, or any other items that are built or assembled to order
on the production floor. Stock goods are those that are simply pulled from inventory for
shipment to a customer. Stock goods included pre-built columns, standard molding, and
retractable attic stairs. Some stock goods like molding are produced on the shop floor,
but are built to stock rather than being built to order. The process for stock items is very
similar to that of assembled items. The following description applies to both categories
of products and any deviations between the two are noted. Furthermore, this is a
description of the process before the document imaging software was introduced.
Each order starts with a salesperson. For a typical new construction project, the
salesperson creates a walk sheet that describes the number and types of doors included in
the project. The salesperson may be able to look at the blueprints to ascertain this
information, but they will often also visit the house being built to verify that the
blueprints match the physical structure. For instance, in the world of production
homebuilding, a blueprint can have a left hand or right hand version, one being the
mirror image of the other. The builder will sometimes specify the wrong version in error,
thereby flipping each interior door from a left-hand to a right-hand opening unit, and vice
versa. Although it may vary by region, the walking of the construction site to verify the
accuracy of the order is part of the service provided by millwork suppliers in Houston.
Each outside salesperson is teamed with an inside salesperson and the walk sheet serves
as the communication medium between the two. Outside salespeople are responsible for
communicating with the customer, while inside salespeople are responsible for entering
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orders and monitoring their progress through production. When the inside salesperson
receives the walk sheet and the purchase order for the sale, they enter the order into the
production system and give it a ship date, i.e. the date on which the order is scheduled for
delivery.
The vast majority of orders are entered with the soonest possible ship date. In BMC
West's Houston Millworks, this is four days after the order is entered. In theory, if an
order is entered on a Monday, the paperwork is processed on Tuesday, the doors are
assembled on Wednesday, and the order is shipped to the customer on the fourth day,
Thursday.
Upon entering the order into the MRP, an order acknowledgement is created and printed.
The order acknowledgement serves as the only indication that the order is to be
processed. At this point, if the order acknowledgement were to be misplaced or lost, the
order would likely go unnoticed until a customer called to complain. For assembled
items, the acknowledgement is then sent to the next department, trafficking, to be
processed for production.
The trafficking department regulates and processes the flow of paperwork onto the
production floor. Each day at the 2:00pm order cutoff, trafficking collects all the order
acknowledgements generated by the inside sales force and processes them for use in
production. For each order, several work orders are printed, one for each physical
production line required to fulfill the order. The order acknowledgement is then stored in
a day file to record the order's presence on the shop floor. At the same time the work
orders print, another smaller label printer generates a label for each door on the work
order. This jamb label will eventually be attached to the door jamb of the finished
product and will provide identification for the material pullers, truck drivers, and
customers. One of the production lines, the metal and fiberglass exterior door line, is
more automated and requires a bar code describing the operations to be completed on the
door. This barcode is generated manually using a separate Microsoft Access application.
Barcodes, jamb labels, and work orders are assembled into a pack and placed in the
production supervisor's desk.
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Before beginning production on a given day, the supervisor quickly looks through the
pending orders to identify any special or complex orders that need particular attention. In
addition, the supervisor will sometimes override the default decision made by the
production scheduling system as to which production line will be used for a given order.
In this case, the order must be removed from the stack and inserted into a different stack.
Work orders are then sent to the production floor where the corresponding doors are
assembled and stored according to the process described in section 6.2 on door assembly.
Each work order is marked with the storage location of the doors and the work orders are
returned to trafficking for delivery scheduling.
Back in trafficking, the work orders are filed with the order acknowledgement. When all
work orders for a given sale are returned and completed, the acknowledgement is pulled
and a pick ticket generated for the order. Pick tickets are printed in the trafficking office
on five part carbon copied paper and are picked up by the shipping department at various
times during the day.
In the shipping office, pick tickets are separated into three stacks. The green copy, or
green as it is known, goes to the door pullers. The white goes to the molding pullers.
The remaining copies go to the driver who gives one copy to the customer, and returns
the remaining copies to the shipping office where they are routed to the accounts
receivable department. The shipping office enters each order into yet another Microsoft
Access database that tracks truck routes or dispatches. Each shipped order has a record
in the dispatch database indicating the route and stop number, the driver, the truck
number, and other relevant information.
In accounts receivable, each order is recorded in the MRP system as having been shipped
successfully. Each night, an automated routine prints an invoice for each shipped order.
In the morning, each invoice in the stack is matched up to the original purchase order,
and if necessary, the signed copy of the pick ticket that was used to deliver the order.
This stack is then folded and put in an envelope for delivery to the customer. Payment is
tracked using the MRP system and various aging reports.
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7. Appendix - Shortest Point Shipping
7.1. Overview
In March of 2006, BMC West acquired Home Lumber and Home Millwork in
Rosenberg, Texas, and put them under the management of the Houston region.
Rosenberg is a small town about 35 miles southwest of downtown Houston. With the
acquisition, BMC West entered the lumber distribution business in Houston. While this
was the primary driver behind the acquisition, Home's small millwork also provided
BMC West with additional capacity in a location well suited to serve the southwest
corner of Houston.
The Home acquisition added three distinct locations to the Houston region: The Home
Millwork, Home Lumber, and the Home Lumber Retail Store. The Home Millwork was
a small production millwork facility that was supplying about 1/2 0th of Lonestar's
volume at the time of purchase. Home Lumber was an established lumber facility that
provided the bulk of Home's revenue. Finally, the Home Lumber Retail Store was a
small retail lumber and hardware store in downtown Rosenberg. Figure 10 below shows
the locations of both Lonestar Millwork and Home Millwork in relation to the city of
Houston.
After the merging of the two millwork locations, BMC West had two independent
facilities, each with its own set of customers spread throughout the greater Houston area.
When my internship started in June, each millwork location would routinely dispatch
delivery trucks to addresses within one or two miles of the other location. Trucks from
one location could be seen driving past the other location on a daily basis. Management
wanted to optimize the manufacturing and shipping of orders so they would originate
from the location closest to the delivery address. This project was called Shortest Point
Shipping.
The following goals were identified for the Shortest Point Shipping project:
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Optimized Outbound Logistics - Although the two millwork facilities shared the
same software by the end of June, there were no processes in place for one location to
enter orders into the other warehouse's production system. As a result, orders for a
specific customer were shipped from the same warehouse their outside salesperson
reported to, regardless of delivery address. The first goal of the Shortest Point
Shipping project was to optimize the order entry and delivery processes to supply
products from the location closest to the delivery address.
Production Leveling - In June, the peak homebuilding season was just getting
underway. Lonestar Millwork was operating very near its maximum effective
capacity. Employees were already working five to ten hours a week of overtime.
Meanwhile, Home Millwork was operating at 1/4tho 11 3 rd of its effective capacity.
The second goal of the Shortest Point Shipping project was to shift orders from one
facility to the other in an attempt to balance the workload.
Order-Entry Centralization - The third and final goal of the Shortest Point
Shipping project was to centralize the order-entry staff into the Lonestar location. In
June, each millwork had its own set of employees responsible for entering orders in
their own location's production system. By combining the two groups into a single
location, customers could be assured of having a single point of contact and the
order-entry staff could be more efficiently utilized. The centralizing of the two
groups could only occur if a reliable process for entering orders from a single location
was created.
7.2. Methodology
7.2.1. Limitations of Existing Process and System
There were several obstacles to reaching the goals of the Shortest Point Shipping project.
Solutions were limited by existing company-wide objectives, the MRP system, and the
local business processes.
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The local and corporate IT stakeholders informed us early on that the MRP software was
due for an upgrade to the next revision at the end of 2006. In preparation for the upgrade,
BMHC's IS group "froze" any modifications to the system, as each modification would
need to be ported and tested with the new version of the software. This meant that any
solutions proposed for the Shortest Point Shipping project were restricted from making
major modifications to the MRP.
For the purposes of inventory control, materials purchasing, and other business processes,
the two millwork locations were specified as separate "warehouses" in the MRP system.
For each new order, the MRP software required the user to designate a warehouse before
entering the contents of the order. As a result, each subsequent step in the order-entry
process (i.e. inventory checks, default shipping address, etc) was dependent on the
assigned warehouse. This limitation, in combination with the moratorium on
modifications, precluded any logic in the MRP that would automatically assign orders to
a warehouse based on existing inventory, facility capability, proximity of the shipping
address, or any other information contained in the order or customer profile.
7.2.2. Shortest Point Shipping Solution
As described above, the limitations of the MRP system made it impossible to
automatically assign a warehouse based on inventory or address proximity. Orders
would therefore have to be manually entered into the correct warehouse based on
external criteria. Given that Home Millwork did not stock the full range of products
available from Lonestar, a customer would only be eligible for Shortest Point Shipping if
the range of products they typically ordered was available at both warehouses. From the
start, only the larger production customers were considered eligible, all others were
serviced by Lonestar.
Each order for a qualified customer would then need to be assigned to a warehouse for
manufacturing and delivery. Since a homebuilder might be simultaneously building
houses in dozens of subdivisions spread across Houston, each subdivision was assigned
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to a warehouse based on a line drawn along the boundaries of Houston zip codes, as
demonstrated in the map below.
V M1 10
Figure 10: The Houston Region - Lonestar and Home
In the main section of the map, the blue dot (upper middle) represents the location of
Lonestar Millwork in the northwest corner of Houston. The red dot (lower left)
represents the location of Home Millwork in Rosenberg. The dark line is drawn along
the boundaries of zip codes such that each zip code lies on one side or the other of the
line. The inset map shows the greater Houston region.
To determine where the zip code line would fall, I started by drawing a line
geographically separating the two facilities. This is shown as the red (dark) diagonal line
in the inset map. In theory, all shipping destinations on one side of the line would be
most efficiently served by the facility on the same side of the line. Using a zip code map,
I assigned each zip code in the greater Houston area to a facility depending on which side
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of the line it fell. Some zip codes were moved from one side to the other so the line
would fall along intuitive boundaries like the I-10 and 1-610 freeways.
Using historical data, I then calculated the theoretical volume that would ship from each
facility based on the presumed boundary. I compared this with the actual capacity of
each facility. Fortunately, this initial boundary divided the Houston market according to
the capacities of the two facilities. The original dividing line, however, cut the southeast
corner of Houston, called League City, in half. League City could easily be served by
either warehouse, but it didn't make sense to serve it from both. Because the proposed
boundary resulted in Lonestar being at a slightly higher utilization, the decision was
made to serve League City from the Home Millwork location in Rosenberg.
Because subdivisions, rather than individual addresses, were assigned to a warehouse, the
order entry staff was able to quickly memorize the optimal warehouse for the most
common subdivisions. Maps showing the boundary and the subdivision assignment were
distributed to help with the remaining locations.
The second and more difficult challenge in the Shortest Point Shipping project was to
create a process by which orders could be entered at the Lonestar location but produced
and shipped from the Home location.
The existing order entry process at both millwork facilities was entirely paper-based. If
an order was to be entered at one location and shipped from the other, the shipping
location had to have access to the paper copy of the order to process it. An obvious way
to meet this requirement was for orders to be entered at Lonestar and printed to a remote
printer at Home Millwork. Unfortunately, this solution was deemed unacceptable
because the MRP system did not have a print spooler that was able to determine whether
or not a specific document actually printed. This meant that a paper jam or a printer
malfunction could result in lost orders. Although the orders would still exist in the
system, it would be impossible to determine whether or not they had been printed and put
into production. In this event, an employee would have to track down all the orders
previously printed and compare them with the orders entered that day to determine which
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orders failed to print. Worse, if the printer malfunction was transient and unnoticed, the
orders might be lost until a customer called to complain.
Another possible solution involved reengineering the order entry processes to more fully
utilize the capabilities of the MRP software and diminish the reliance on paper
documents. The software already had built-in reports that allow the trafficking and
shipping departments to query the system for outstanding orders that need their attention.
Under a reengineered process, the trafficking department could run a report showing all
order acknowledgements to be printed to work orders for a given delivery date.
Unfortunately, the delivery dates in the system had become unreliable because of the
longstanding dependence on paper copies, and a shift toward the revised process would
represent a major cultural and tactical change. Both the management and the employees
were unsupportive of such a drastic change, so this option was out of the question.
Ultimately, we decided to use an existing "flag" in the software to designate the pending
orders that were yet to be printed and put into production. A custom report was created
that listed the "flagged" orders for personnel at the other warehouse.
In the existing paper-based system, order acknowledgements were put into production
once they were printed. Subsequent printed copies of the order had the word
"***REPRINT***" at the top, notifying employees that this order had printed before and
may already in production. This precaution was put in place to avoid making and
shipping the same order multiple times.
Under the proposed Shortest Point Shipping process, each order destined for Home
Millwork would be entered at Lonestar and not printed. This would keep the flag
described above from being set. We then developed a custom report that listed all orders
for the Home warehouse that were never printed. These orders were then printed and put
into production at Home. As soon as they were printed, they would be excluded from the
list and would not appear the next time the report was run.
The workflow for the new process was presented to and validated by the relevant
stakeholders at Lonestar and Home. The custom report described above was created in
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coordination with the Information Systems group in Boise. A sample of what the report
output would look like is reproduced below.
Order Entry - Unprinted Orders Report
Ranges: Begin End
I Whse default default
2 Entered Date yesterday today
3 Entered Time XX:XX XX:XX
4 Promised Date XX/XX/XX XX/XX/XX
5 Taken By XXXX XXXX
6 Stage Code 1 1
Options:
1 Include Unprinted Orders Report yes
2 Sort (L) ines, (O) rder, (E)nter, (T) aken, (P) romise E
3 Group (N) one, (L) ines, (E)nter, (T) aken, (P)romise L
4 Include Usage Report yes
5 Sort (S)ku, (O)rder, (P)romise S
6 Months in Usage 6
7 Include Kits and RBC no
Jnprinted Orders Report
Order# Entered Time Tkn By Prn'mised Lines
4940000-00 06/01/06 09:23 kac 06/05/06
4940002-00 06/01/06 09:35 s ao 06/06/06
4940102-00 06/01/06 11 56 kac 06/06/06
4940107-00 06/01/06 13:02 kac 06/05/06
4940003-00 06/01/06 10:31 9ao 06/19/06 Il
4940010-01 06/01/06 13:14 kac 06/05/06 11,El
4940000-00 06/01/06 14:01 kac 06/05/06 I1,El
Figure 11: OEZRA "Unprinted Orders" Report
The custom report, called OEZRA in the MRP system, indicated which orders needed to
be printed and put into production. A second report, WORZU, was used to identify any
orders that had reached their production date but had mistakenly not been printed to work
orders yet. Between these two reports, all orders destined for production at Home
Millwork would be produced and delivered on time.
In December of 2006, the OEZRA report was first used at Home Millwork for a single
customer. Much of the work had already been shifted to Home Millwork, but was being
entered by Home's inside sales force. This group was officially disbanded in mid
December. In January of 2007, the Shortest Point Shipping process was rolled out to the
other customers being served by Home Millwork.
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7.3. Results and Discussion
Houston management began shifting work from Lonestar to Home Millwork almost
immediately after Home's conversion to the standard MRP. The following chart shows
the combined monthly revenue for the two millworks, with the darker shaded portion
showing the revenue that was shipped from the "wrong" warehouse based on the
geographical zip code boundary described in the previous section. This chart was
constructed using the customer designation of production or custom builder. Only
production builders were considered candidates for having products shipped from both
warehouses, as Home Millwork is not capable of supplying the full range of custom
products. The line chart on the secondary axis shows the percentage of revenue shipped
from the wrong warehouse.
Materials Shipped from "Wrong" Warehouse
Wrong Whse Right Whse -*- Percent
800 20.0%
600 - 15.0%
C 400 -_-_-_-_ - 10.0%
200 -- 5.0%
0 0.0%
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Figure 12: Materials shipped from the wrong warehouse3 4
The chart indicates that even as the two warehouses were merged, the majority of orders
were essentially being shipped from the correct location. Given a uniform distribution of
orders over the city of Houston, one would have expected the ratio to have been closer to
50% at the start. Over the second half of the year, the percentage of orders shipped from
the farther warehouse slowly and consistently fell to a level of about 8% by the end of the
34 Dollar amounts are scaled to protect confidentiality.
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year. It is expected that this number will not fall to zero, as some customers require
special processes or products that currently cannot be produced at both facilities.
Although the Shortest Point Shipping effort has resulted in a continuing improvement in
the outbound logistics, it is not clear that the optimization translates into significant cost
savings. The following discussion analyzes BMC West's logistics data and quantifies the
theoretical and actual reduction in miles traveled by delivery trucks under the Shortest
Point Shipping scenario.
The shipping offices at each millwork collect data on every order they process and every
truck they dispatch. With this information, I was able to reconstruct the routes taken by
each truck on a daily basis. In addition, each delivery address is entered into the MRP
system with an associated "Key Map Page" 35. The Key Map Page indicates the
geographical location of the address to within a /4 by 3 mile grid. By combining this
information, I was able to determine the approximate distance each truck traveled for any
given route. I was also able to construct two theoretical scenarios. Under the first, each
truck made deliveries to its assigned addresses, but was dispatched from the optimal
warehouse based on the zip code boundary. This scenario allowed me to calculate the
maximum possible reduction in miles driven if each order was optimally dispatched. In
the second scenario, all trucks were dispatched from the Lonestar millwork. This
scenario allowed me to calculate the increase in miles driven if Home Millwork were
shut down and all orders originated at Lonestar.
In this analysis, I chose to neglect the customer type (production vs. custom) and
therefore overestimated the potential savings in the "optimal" scenario. I also did not
attempt to reroute the individual deliveries made by each truck, rather I simply
dispatched them from one warehouse or the other. It is entirely possible that more
sophisticated routing techniques could further optimize outbound logistics. Each route
distance was approximated "as the crow flies", i.e. with straight lines between each
3 http://www.keymaps.com -The Key Map is a detailed set of multi-page maps covering the southeast
Texas region sold by Key Maps, Inc.
86
delivery point instead of actual miles driven. Finally, December's dispatch data was
incomplete, so only half of the month is included in this analysis. The potential savings
in this month are abnormally high which could be an artifact of the incomplete data. The
following chart shows the three comparison scenarios. The line chart on the secondary
axis indicates the potential savings possible between the "Lonestar Only" and the
"Optimal" scenarios. This means that for the month of September, for instance, the total
miles driven in an optimal scenario would be approximately 8% lower than if all
deliveries originated at the Lonestar Millwork. The actual miles driven falls between the
two extremes.
Total Shipping Distance - Three Scenarios
120,000 12%
100,000- 10%
80,000 --- - - 8%
w 60,000-- 6%
40,000 4%
20,000 2%
0 0
Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Actual am Lonestar Only Optimal -- Potential Savings
Figure 13: Total shipping distance under three scenarios
This chart indicates that the actual miles driven monthly fell toward the level of the
"Optimal" scenario as the year progressed. More interestingly, however, the chart
indicates that the potential cost savings from this decreased delivery distance, even if it
reached the level of the optimized scenario, is relatively small. The average of the
potential savings between the "Lonestar Only" and the "Optimal" scenarios between June
and November is approximately 6,250 miles per month, representing a decrease of about
7.6%. Over the same period, the actual miles traveled were on average about 1.9% below
the "Lonestar Only" scenario. Although the data is unavailable at the time of this
writing, I strongly suspect that much if not all of the benefit gained from the optimized
shipping is outweighed by the higher manufacturing costs at the smaller Home Millwork,
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as well as the additional overhead and organizational effort expended to coordinate the
joint operation of two facilities
Home Millwork, however, is not being operated because it provides a more optimized
shipping location, but because Lonestar Millwork is currently operating at capacity.
Although the products being produced in Rosenberg are more costly and require a
duplication of overhead, the Houston region simply has no short term choice if they are
to meet the growing demand of their customers. That being said, it would be very
interesting to follow this analysis with a more thorough investigation of the costs
incurred by operating the second facility in Rosenberg. By assigning a "per mile" cost
for deliveries, the reduction in total delivery miles shown above could be quantified in
dollar terms and compared against the costs.
If the Houston region is in fact spending more at Home Millwork than they are saving,
management would be left with a strategic decision. One option would be to keep
spending money in Rosenberg, viewing it as the cost of maintaining the excess capacity.
Another option would be to spend the same money in increasing the capacity at Lonestar,
perhaps by optimizing the material storage and delivery on the production lines, or by
expanding the existing facility and adding production lines.
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8. Appendix - Document Imaging Implementation
8.1. Document Imaging at Lonestar Millwork
8.1.1. Overview
As previously described, in March of 2006 Home Lumber and Home Millwork were
acquired by BMC West and put under the management of the Houston region. Home
was acquired for several reasons, foremost among them was the entry into the lumber
market in Houston. A valuable aspect of the deal, however, was that Home had a
working document imaging process that virtually eliminated the archival of paperwork
and significantly reduced the effort necessary to invoice completed orders.
After the acquisition, the first order of business was the conversion of Home's MRP
system to the same system used at Lonestar. This conversion happened in the first month
of the internship. Soon after the conversion was completed and the majority of the bugs
were found and fixed, focus was put on implementing Imigit, Home's document imaging
software, at Lonestar in Houston.
8.1.2. The Business Case for Document Imaging
The Lonestar Millwork in Houston, Texas is one of the largest millwork facilities under
one roof in the United States. In a given day, the facility might ship as many as 50
house-packs, each containing 15 or more doors. Each order generates a stack of paper
documentation as it flows through the order entry and manufacturing process.
BMC West's MRP system maintains an electronic record of each order and tracks its
progress through the manufacturing process. The paper copy of the order, however, is
the master document. It is the manipulation and passing of the physical copy that
actually regulates the flow of manufacturing. At certain stages of the process, if the
paper copy were to be misplaced, it would not be apparent until the customer called to
complain about their missing materials. Redundancies in the system exist to avoid this
situation. Nevertheless, order paperwork is periodically misplaced.
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Home Lumber and Millwork used a piece of software called Imigit, developed and
maintained by Profitability of Hawaii36. Imigit is an application suite that allows for the
storage, indexing, and retrieval of digital and scanned documents. Although it did not
replace the paper based production process at Home Millwork, it did allow for the
massive quantity of paperwork generated by the process to be scanned and discarded.
Before implementing the Imigit software at Lonestar, all paperwork was archived in file
boxes. The picture below shows the location where this paperwork was stored.
Figure 14: Archival area for order processing paperwork
Another maj or benefit of document imaging was the streamlining of the invoicing
process. Each invoice at Lonestar was bundled with the purchase order from the
customer, and if necessary, a signed pick ticket verifying that the goods were delivered to
the jobsite. These documents were stored by the accounts receivable group. Each day,
the documents for each invoice had to be pulled from the files and associated with the
correct invoice. These documents were often missing and had to be tracked down. With
Imigit, documents could be scanned in such a way as to indicate whether or not they
should be printed with the invoice. All signed pick tickets, for instance, were scanned in
this way. When the accounts receivable department ran the invoicing process, invoices
would print, along with all documentation that was scanned to indicate that it should also
be included. The stack of papers for a single order was then simply put in an envelope
36 http://www.poh.com -Profitability of Hawaii owns and maintains the Imigit software suite.
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and sent to the customer with no searching for and retrieving of the necessary
supplemental documentation. Imigit allowed for a significant reduction in the effort and
time necessary to complete the daily invoicing process.
In addition to streamlining the invoicing process, the stack of file cabinets used to store
the paperwork for each order could be eliminated. Before Imigit, these file cabinets
occupied an area of approximately 400 square feet in the accounts receivable department.
The following picture shows these file cabinets prior to the installation of Imigit.
Figure 15: Accounts Receivable file cabinets
8.1.3. The Imigit Document Imaging Application
Imigit is split into a server application and a client application. The server stores and
retrieves the digitized documents, while the client application presents an interface that
allows users to sort, search, and view documents.
Digitized documents are organized as if they are in a physical filing cabinet. In this way,
the conversion to digital documents presents less of a shift in the minds and processes of
the employees who will use the system. At the highest level of the document hierarchy
are cabinets. A cabinet represents a collection of folders and documents and each region
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would likely receive its own cabinet to work from. In Houston's case, for instance, the
region had a cabinet called HOUSOE for all order entry documents for both millwork
locations. Each cabinet containsfolders. Folders hold individual collections of
documents and were named to correspond to the customer number. For instance, all of
the order entry documents pertaining to customer number 2231349 would be stored in the
folder called C2231349 in the cabinet called HOUSOE. Each folder contains
documents and each document may contain one or more pages. Documents were stored
by order number and included a letter prefix indicating the type of document. For
instance, all order entry documents were stored with a prefix "A". So for instance, the
order acknowledgement for order number 1234567-00 would be stored with a document
name of "A1234567-00". All document names are unique, and if more than one order
acknowledgement was generated, the second would be stored as "A1234567-00.1". The
following figure from the training materials shows this hierarchy in graphical form.
imigit Filing System
Cabinet
Represents a separate filing system.
Example HOUSoE - Order Entry Docs.
Folder
Represents folders in a file cabinet
Example: cxxxxxxx
One folder for each customer
Document
Represents documents in a folder each with multiple pages
Each document is based on order number in N risjpagx
Example S5230000 - Acknowledgment and Pick Ticket
Page
Represents each page in a document-
Each page associated with a Document ID
Figure 16: The Imigit filing system
Much of the process around digitizing documents was developed at Home Lumber and
Millwork before the acquisition. During the MRP system conversion, the document
imaging process was translated as well. All documents printed from the MRP were
forked at the print driver. One copy went to the physical printer that was specified by the
user. The other copy went to the Imigit software. The Imigit software would then "read"
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the document, recognize its format (Order Acknowledgement, Work Order, etc) and
would create both the digitized image of the document, and the metadata associated with
it, including order number, customer number, and all other information contained in the
document.
Several physical paper documents containing signatures and other markings were also
stored in the document imaging system. For this, a group of employees was designated
as the scanning team. In the case of documents printed from the MRP, each document
had a barcode printed on it that encoded the order number. For all other documents, the
order number was written in the top right-hand corner of the document. Stacks of similar
documents like purchase orders or completed work orders would be fed through a black
and white scanner3 7 . Those documents with barcodes would be automatically recognized
and filed under the appropriate customer folder and order number. Those documents
with handwritten order numbers would be put in a batch for continued processing. After
scanning all the documents, the user would go back and look at all documents for which
the software could not read the barcode, or which had a handwritten order number. The
user would then type in the order number manually. Documents could be coded in
approximately one to two seconds each.
Retrieval of documents was very fast and easy. Documents were stored based on
document type and order number, and either criterion could be used to search for single
documents or ranges of documents. For instance, one could search for all invoices
(documents beginning with I, as in 11234567-00) generated within a certain range of
dates. One could also search for all documents for a given order number. Wildcards and
Boolean operations made it possible to construct very sophisticated searches. In addition
to searching for documents, one could also search for folders using similar methods.
37 Lonestar and Home Millwork used Fujitsu Document Scanners and they performed very well and
produced decent scanned images. The rollers in these scanners would at times wear out and multiple pages
would feed through the scanner at one time. Scanning personnel became very skilled at monitoring the
scanning process and catching these errors.
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8.2. Methodology and Procedure
8.2.1. Project Scope
The goal of the Lonestar Imigit project was to implement the Imigit software and
introduce the associated procedural changes at the Lonestar Millwork in Houston, Texas.
At the time I became involved with the project, Home Millwork had converted from its
old MRP to the BMC West standard MRP. Home had also successfully implemented the
Imigit software and process in their location and therefore served as a model for the
implementation at Lonestar. At the same time, Lonestar processed approximately ten
times the order volume of Home Millwork, and procedures and job functions were
accordingly more complex.
8.2.2. Requirements Gathering and Workflow Documentation
Many of the requirements for the implementation of Imigit at Lonestar Millwork were
known at the beginning of the project. Home Millwork already had an operational
process and many of the MRP software modifications were already completed. Lonestar,
however, had a much larger operation and had a much more complicated range of
products than did Home Millwork. Whereas Home Millwork produced only production
millwork, Lonestar manufactured and soldfull custom products that required CAD
drawings and other documentation in addition to the standard set of production
documents. Lonestar also sold cabinets and windows, both products having non-standard
documentation. Furthermore, Lonestar worked with a third party to install exterior doors.
Although Lonestar's Imigit workflow would be patterned after Home's implementation,
the added complexity meant that differences in the underlying business processes could
still exist. This made it necessary to first understand the existing workflows before
moving ahead.
To understand the current workflows at the Lonestar Millwork, I conducted interviews
with the various groups involved: Order Entry, Trafficking, Production, Purchasing and
Shipping. The local project leader, Lettie Huber, and I constructed the existing
workflows for both production products and full custom products. Using the existing
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workflows, we constructed proposed workflows based off the existing Imigit
implementation at Home Millwork. We then validated both sets of workflows with the
appropriate functional groups.
8.2.3. New Process Training
After constructing and documenting the new workflows, the employees at Lonestar were
trained using the new system. We created training materials and introduced the Imigit
software during hour-long training sessions with groups of six people per session. The
new workflows were very similar to the existing process, so the change was relatively
intuitive. The biggest difference was in having to search the "virtual" file cabinet instead
of going to a physical file cabinet to find paperwork.
Some groups, including the accounts receivable department and scanning team, required
far more extensive training, as their workflows were changed to a large degree. In all,
training took place over an entire week, with some follow up sessions conducted over the
following weeks as needed for specific groups.
8.3. Results and Discussion
8.3.1. The Solution Delivery Methodology (SDM)
The Imigit project team fully utilized BMHC's Solution Delivery Methodology, or SDM.
The methodology specifies the process by which a project is advanced from the original
idea, through implementation, and to subsequent version upgrades. It specifies the key
stakeholders involved in the project and outlines their responsibilities. The details and
inner workings of the SDM are considered proprietary and are therefore confidential.
The results of using the process, however, were very positive.
The Imigit project was completed very successfully due to the use of the SDM process.
In the past, IT projects in Houston have not run so smoothly due to breakdowns in
communications, schedule overruns, confusion over responsibility and deliverables, etc.
During this project, the project manager was very clear about roles and responsibilities
and was very active in maintaining an accurate project plan and making sure that people
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lived up to their promises concerning the project. In addition to the project manager, a
local champion, Lettie Huber, was identified and fully staffed on the project. This
employee was given access to various stakeholders at the corporate level and the
software vendor, and was given the authority to drive the project to completion. Between
these two roles, one at the local level and one at the corporate level, communications
back and forth were smooth, timely, and accurate.
8.3.2. Reduced Effort in Invoicing
The Imigit software and process significantly decreased the effort necessary to invoice
customers. With the old process, accounts receivable employees spent the better part of
each day searching for missing documentation to complete the invoice packets for
customers. With the new process, missing documentation was eliminated and all that
remained was stuffing invoices and the associated scanned documents into envelopes.
8.3.3. Reduced Storage of Documents
At the time the internship ended, the organization had completely switched to document
imaging, and therefore had eliminated its need for archived copies of completed
paperwork. The database was hosted on the corporate servers in Las Vegas and was
regularly backed up. The organization, however, was still keeping hard copies for 60
days for backup purposes until the new system was proven to be trustworthy. It is
expected that the large volume of archived documents shown in Figure 14 will be
eliminated in the near future.
8.3.4. Increased availability of Documentation in Production
The production employees found the document imaging software to be immensely
valuable. Often, a production supervisor must look up paperwork to check on the
information contained. Before the document imaging software, the person had to search
a physical file located in a central area. Now supervisors have the information directly at
their desks and are able to quickly search for the documents they need. The feedback
from this group was overwhelmingly positive.
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